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Abstract
Listing on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index is seen as a gold-standard, verifying to the market
that a firm is fully engaged with a corporate social responsibility agenda. Robustly quantifying the
impact of listing, and de-listing, against any industry level shocks, as well as evolution in the competitive
relationship between firms within the industry, provides a strength absent in existing works. It is shown
that cumulative abnormal returns on stocks added to the index are significantly positive in the three
trading weeks prior to the official announcement. The post-listing correction result posited to date is
also demonstrated to hold; the proportion of periods with significant negative returns is low, however.
Announcement, rather than effective dates are critical to returns. Differentials between these stages
in the chronology is an important contribution of this paper. Most effects end before the membership
changes become effective. Whilst there are considerable gains to be made, they come pre-announcement
date and require foresight to exploit. Investors must research likely new members to gain maximum
return.
Keywords: Listing effects, abnormal returns, corporate social responsibility, index additions, synthetic
control.
1 Introduction
Increasing recognition of the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to firms performance is
drawing natural attention to the subsequent link to stock returns. An implicit trade off between enhancing
reputation and the costs of implementing improved practices has troubled analysts reconciling the observed
trends of firms striving to achieve market leadership on CSR. Many theories have been posited for the
effect sustainable practice will have on stock returns, resulting in an ambiguity about what response will be
observed. Isolating a CSR effect on stock returns requires three key elements to ensure correct identification.
Firstly there must be agreed empirical evidence that a firm is practising CSR, this must be independently
verifiable to be trustworthy to investors. Secondly, information about a firms CSR leadership must be visible
to the market through a clearly identifiable channel. For Fowler and Hope (2007) these must be verified by
an assessor who is independent from the firm. Finally, it must be possible to isolate decisions based upon
that information from all other characteristics of the firm that might otherwise influence stock returns. This
paper meets the challenge using the Dow Jones Sustainablity Index (DJSI), which sees firms independently
assessed for inclusion and evidences sustainability in a binary fashion. That listings are reappraised only
once each year provides an ideal test point for the impact of CSR leadership on stock returns.
Generating results from two-sample comparisons and dummy variable regression approaches we verify
that our dataset produces the same ambiguity of conclusions that characterise other studies on CSR and
returns. Insights developed in what follows have demonstrable robustness to industry, or economy wide
level shocks; the reference for abnormal returns is not the past performance of the share but the present
performance of a portfolio of shares weighted to match the performance of the share over a long pre-treatment
period. This paper thus contributes deeper understanding of the impact of CSR behaviour recognition on
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stock returns in a framework attentive to wider conditions, competition and the relative performance within
the sector.
Begun with a global index in 1999 with a global index, the DJSI family has expanded rapidly to include
a number of regional and themed indices. First of the expansions was the creation of North American list
to cover the United States and Canada; this is the index that is referred to as DJSI in all that follows. In
each case the principle of determining which firms will be listed is highly similar, the leading firms in each
industry being selected. Early establishment of the DJSI as a measure of CSR leadership is provided in
the works of Fowler and Hope (2007) and Hawn et al. (2018). For all indexes firms are invited to submit
a wealth of documentation for evaluation, this weighty evidence then informing the inclusion decision of
Robecco Sustainable Asset Management (Robecco SAM). Assessment of firms is constantly evolving to reflect
current best practice, helping maintain the association between listing and market leadership. Leadership
is questioned by Ziegler and Schro¨der (2010) and Oberndorfer et al. (2013), who contend that the signal is
actually one which says that firms are effectively following competitive strategies that respond to the market
for pecuniary advantage. Responses to this critique note that in innovating to pursue such strategies firms
do become leaders.
Although there is disagreement on measuring CSR, a listing on one of the DJSI indexes signals clearly to
the market that a firm is meeting critical Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards1. As a measure
of CSR it is binary, making interpretation simple. Firms are clear leaders in their market, or they are not;
membership of the DJSI identifying the former. Studying DJSI listing, or continued membership, becomes
simpler than discerning the marginal effects of indexes that are reported for only subsets of the wider set
of traded firms2. Such binary delineation also facilitates event studies and treatment effect approaches
of the type performed here. From an investor behaviour perspective it is implicitly assumed that listing
conveys information more effectively than discerning marginal effects amongst metrics of CSR activity.
Evidence on the benefit of simple communication is provided by Hartzmark and Sussman (2018) review of
investor response to the Morningstar globe ratings for mutual fund sustainability3. Information used for
their construction is all public meaning the large reaction demonstrated may be entirely attributed to the
simplicity of the rating.
Event studies have advantage where timings are known and exogenous to the units being considered
MacKinlay (1997). Listing on a social responsibility index, such as the DJSI, is completely exogenous from
the share price of a particular firm. Likewise although the inclusion of a firm into the index is a result of the
firms efforts it is timed at a point dictated by the listing agency. It is this that offers the requisite exogeneity.
The financial literature expanding upon CSR events focuses on either company specific events, or exogenous
occurrences that impact a subset of stocks4. Index listing, or de-listing, fits firmly into this second class5. An
endogeneity in listings based on financial performance may be argued, the direction of the relationship being
blurred in empirical work (Scholtens, 2008). However, for social indexes where assessments are undertaken,
and decisions made, far ahead of the announcement there will be no changes close to listing dates that would
provide any information about the likelihood of listings.
Evaluations of the effect of joining the DJSI have applied event studies on listing announcements (Cheung,
2011; Robinson et al., 2011; Lourenc¸o et al., 2014; Joshi et al., 2017; Hawn et al., 2018). Consistent through
all of these works is the belief that there needs to be consideration of the time before, and after, the
announcement rather than a focus purely on the announcement week itself. Hawn et al. (2018) does not
go beyond a few days but the data in their tables suggests there may be effects across longer date ranges.
Motivation for longer time frames comes from the imperfect information in the markets and the ability
of some traders to form meaningful expectations of any upcoming listing. There is evidence of a number
of abnormal movements presented here that is consistent with information being available to only some
1Disagreement about CSR measurement is charted in Scalet and Kelly (2010) and subsequently Venturelli et al. (2017).
2Continuous measures are often born from research carried out by teams at large agencies such as MSCI KLD. From here
emerges either a scale reading or a series of binary evaluations of strengths and concerns that then form the measure using net
strengths. Whilst not continuous there are advantages over the low level of splitting offered by the DJSI dummy. However, as
Mattingly (2017) notes in reviewing the dataset there are challenges of subjectivity in measure construction and problems of
data coverage outside the biggest firms.
3The Morningstar globes rate the sustainability of the holdings of all mutual funds listed on Morningstar, one of the world
leading fund websites. Funds are given a rating between one and five globes, with the latter informing on leadership.
4Clacher and Hagendorff (2012) and Cai and He (2014) fall into the category of single company events
5Wider consideration of listing as an event drives Denis et al. (2003) evaluation of learning expectations following inclusion
in the S&P 500 index. A large literature on listing effects follows in this mould.
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investors. Evaluation of the abnormal returns therefore begins three weeks before the actual announcement,
with most pre-announcement changes occurring around two weeks ahead of the official release of the DJSI
constituent list. A further consistency lies in the creation of abnormal returns in the short term, but that
all shares revert to their expected levels within a few weeks of the announcements6.
Oberndorfer et al. (2013) posit two competing hypotheses for the short term impact of DJSI listing,
a revisionist and a traditionalist perspective. Revisionists argue that inclusion represents a commitment
to stakeholders that boosts sales, increases employee happiness and hence productivity, is hard for rivals to
compete against and sets an upward trend of financial performance. Consequently the revisionist argument is
summarised by Oberndorfer et al. (2013) as leading to positive short term listing effects. Contrary to this the
traditionalist approach contends that focus on CSR diverts resources from productive endeavours, reducing
productivity and hence lowering profitability. In practice investors may expect either one of these hypotheses
to hold true. A signal of sustainability leadership from a DJSI listing may thus result in either an increased,
or decreased, return dependent on the dominant effect. Results on listings presented herein, consistent with
the pre-announcement and correction effects, point to the revisionist angle dominating those receiving news
ahead of the listing. In this paper that is also true for the immediate post listing announcement period
also. Corrections may suggest that the traditionalist effect dominates as the changes become effective, but
equally may simply signal that the market believes the original revisionist appraisal was too optimistic. In
the case of firms which exit the list the traditionalist approach drives positive returns, with the subsequent
correction being in the revisionist direction. In both cases the hype around the listing date is driving much
larger effects than the market ultimately displays, the correction effect bringing the models back towards
their past trends.
Other studies consider alternative indices such as the Newsweek Green Rankings7 (Cordeiro and Tewari,
2015) and the World’s Most Ethical Companies list (Karim et al., 2016). As public facing measures these
have garnered greater media coverage. Cordeiro and Tewari (2015) hypothesised higher rankings in the 2009
listing would correspond to stronger favourable reactions, and that this would continue both short-term and
long-term; evidence of such effects is found. For works dependent on such single-year orderings there is an
inevitable problem of repeatability; we demonstrate subsequently the impact of DJSI listing is significantly
different during the period studied by Cordeiro and Tewari (2015).
Methodologically, synthetic control approaches after Abadie et al. (2010), offer natural synergies in fi-
nance, where their allocations of weightings to a series of assets to create a portfolio that recreates the
asset of interest is synonymous with exchange traded funds. This motivates work on the effect of political
connections to the Trump administration following the 2016 presidential election (Acemoglu et al., 2016),
the impact of the Arab Spring on Egyptian markets relative to others (Acemoglu et al., 2017), as well as
Chamon et al. (2017) work on currency interventions in Brazil. In each case comparison with a portfolio of
assets is championed as effective in capturing the change from the treatment, be that political connections,
the position of the Egyptian market, or the Brazilian currency. This paper preserves the benefits exposited
in these papers, whilst simultaneously introducing an ability to cope with multiple listings from the same
asset group in the same period.
Whilst the Abadie et al. (2010) approach has much to offer, an inability to handle multiple treatment
units simultaneously, and computationally intensive confidence interval calculation, have limited adoption.
This paper responds using the generalised synthetic control (Xu, 2017) 8. Primary advantages of so doing
are the ability to produce treatments that recognised the simultaneity derived from a single potential listing
date per year. Further the software implementation of the generalised synthetic control, gsynth (Xu and
Liu, 2018), generates all necessary confidence intervals meaning there is no need to manually implement the
bootstrapping approach of placebo treatments used in Acemoglu et al. (2016).
Three key contributions are made to the literature. A primary contribution comes in the formalisation
6International studies likewise find evidence of short-term effects (Oberndorfer et al., 2013; Orsato et al., 2015; Nakai et al.,
2013).
7The Newsweek Green Rankings were first released in 2009 and gained wide interest in the USA. Scores are constructed
as a combination of an environmental impact score (45%) using emissions data, green policies (45%) which are obtained in
part from the KLD database, and a green reputation score (10%) based on a survey of relevant stakeholders and academics
(Cordeiro and Tewari, 2015). These are thus more environmentally focused than the DJSI index which captures more of the
social responsibility range.
8This development from synthetic to generalised synthetic has been kept up with in the political economy literature. Inter-
ested readers are direct to Abadie et al. (2015).
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of the effect of pre-announcement leakage of news about changes in firm’s DJSI membership status. We
evidence some post-change correction on those firms which join the DJSI and those who are announced as
being delisted. Such is as rationality may expect. We demonstrate that the effects occur further from the
effective date than suggested by simple construction of abnormal returns against a CAPM fit. Quantitatively
different investment direction is thus found. In recognising simultaneous treatments we show the market also
moves post announcement reducing the extent to which any increased returns can be classed as abnormal.
Through its treatment of multiple firm listings at the same time this paper meets the challenges laid down in
the recent work on the synthetic control method by Abadie et al. (2015); Acemoglu et al. (2016) and others.
Thirdly, the recognition of contemporaneous treatment developed here can be readily ported out of these
listing effects studies and into the wider event study framework. Across these three contributions we deliver
a deeper, more robust, evaluation of the effect of listing on the DJSI upon abnormal stock returns.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Data, abnormal return construction and financial
controls are introduced in Section 2. Two-sample results, and OLS regressions that measure DJSI listing as
a dummy variable are set out in Section 3 as a comparator for the subsequent analysis. Section 4 details
the generalised synthetic control method and gives results from the comparisons between listed shares and
counterfactual alternatives constructed on the assumption those firms did not join the DJSI. Section 6 reviews
the information gained from this robust analysis before Section 7 reinforces the value of the work and the
ways in which useful extensions may be made.
2 Data and Empirical Approach
When considering changes in the constituents of the DJSI as a result of the annual review there are four
possible combinations of before, and after, status. Firstly there are those firms who are listed on the DJSI
and, following the announcement are still listed. These are the firms who stay on the list and continue to
be recognised for their CSR leadership. Likewise there are those firms for whom standards did not, and still
do not, meet DJSI inclusion criteria, these are the firms who stay off and again see no change in their DJSI
status. In this paper focus is on those firms who change status. Those who meet the assessment criteria will
gain listing, whilst those whose standards fall will lose their place.
Recognising industry differentials in the assessment criteria, and recognising unobserved heterogeneity
between industries in stock returns, all control samples for the assessment of listing status changes are
drawn from the same industry. Given that not all industries will have a listed, or de-listed firm, in a given
announcement it follows that the samples used to study the listing and de-listing effects will differ. This and
subsequent sections run the analysis of listing and de-listing contemporaneously to ease comparisons.
A key delineation is made between comparisons run on the full set of control firms and those which first
eliminate a subset of the potential controls to create balance. This full sample versus base sample approach is
replicated here for similar motivations. Details of the sample construction process follow. Primary evaluation
of listing, or de-listing effects is made using abnormal returns on a daily basis. These returns may be combined
over time to produce a mean square percentage error as a barometer of model fit. That construction is also
detailed below. Finally we present the descriptive statistics incorporating listing/de-listing and full/base
samples.
2.1 Full Sample
Data on constituents of the DJSI is constructed using listings from RobeccoSam, with entries recorded for
each year9. For each listing, or de-listing, the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
code is obtained at the two-digit level. Utilising unambiguous industry definitions in this way facilitates
the formation of a control sample from the same industry, guarding against impacts from industry level
heterogeneities. Share price data comes from CRSP and is gathered daily for the period beginning the first
of November in the year prior to the listing, to a date 15 days after the listing becomes effective. This
results in up to 250 observations for each firm. In order to be included in the samples the firms must have
sufficient numbers of observations throughout the studied period. Data on firms accounting fundamentals is
taken from Compustat. Data is merged such that the accounting data from the financial year previous to
9An introduction to the index, containing details of how to construct an entrants list, is provided in RobecoSAM (2013).
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Figure 1: Listing Timeline
Notes: Control refers to the period over which models are trained, beginning at time Tstart and ending 16 days prior to the
announcement at time Tend. The length of the control period is defined as Tc and represents the difference in trading days
between Tstart and Tend The subsequent day,Tend + 1, is the first in the treatment period over which models are assessed.
This treatment period ends after T0 periods at time Tend + T0. Within the treatment period there are two key dates TAnn
when the announcement of changes to the constituents is made and TEff , one week later, when those changes become
effective. Announcement periods vary by year, but in all cases Tstart is the 1st November in the year prior to the
announcement being studied.
the announcement being studied is used as controls. Given all announcements take place in September such
an alignment approach is consistent with the established practice of using firm financial characteristics for
the previous calendar year only after July 31st.
Figure 1 depicts the periods discussed in the exposition that follows. In all cases the specific time (trading
day) being considered is referred to as t. A control period, t ∈ [Tstart, Tend] is defined as the period over
which all models are trained. Model performance is then evaluated in the treatment period which begins on
day Tend + 1 and ends on day Tend + T0, T0 days later. Following past works the treatment period extends
15 trading days before the index composition announcement and ends 15 days after the effective date. This
represents a change from many studies who only base their period around as single treatment day. There are
5 trading days, 1 week, between the announcement and effective dates such that the total period is 36 days.
Henceforth we can think of the treatment period as capturing t ∈ [1, 36] as the time frame for which we are
evaluating listing/de-listing effects, with T0 = 36. In this way announcement day becomes day 16 and the
effective day is day 21. Consequently, the treatment period extends through October, ending on a different
date each time. To ensure that there is no overlap, and that there is no impact of any past membership
announcements on subsequent periods, the control period for the subsequent year does not begin until 1st
November. This pattern repeats for each year between the formation of the DJSI North America in 2005
and 2018, being the final year for which we have the data completed. Our share data thus runs from 1st
November 2004 to 16th October 2018, 15 trading days after the 24th September 2018 effective date. De-
listing requires that a firm first be on the DJSI North America; the first delistings are only found in the 2006
announcements.
In any given year the number of treated observations can vary, and many industries will not feature
amongst either the newly listed set, or the de-listed set. Two digit NAICS codes, and the number of
entering firms there from, are reported in Table 1. Panel A reports the numbers for listings (L), whilst
Panel B provides numbers for de-listings (D). In each case the number of control firms is given by C. For
the univariate and regression approaches these numbers do not present a challenge, but for the generation of
counterfactual versions of listed shares the numbers in L, or D are important. The original synthetic control
method of Abadie et al. (2010) allows for only one treated unit but it is clear from the numbers that many
year-industry pairs have more than one entrant or exiting firm. In this case we can not ignore the potential
impact that the other newly listed firm might have upon any other firm gaining DJSI listed status. Likewise
effects of other de-listed firms also require control. Hence there is a call for a methodology that is robust to
such diversity of treated unit profiles; Xu (2017) employed in Section 4.2 meets this call.
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Table 1: Treatment and Control Numbers
NAICS 2-Digit Industry Code
21 22 23 31 32 33 42 44 45 48 51 52 53 54 56 62 72 Total
Panel A: Listings
2005 L 1 6 1 3 8 9 4 1 1 4 7 2 1 1 49
C 129 99 31 105 318 661 89 53 89 285 535 112 57 62 2625
2006 L 2 4 1 3 1 1 1 3 16
C 140 104 109 327 683 82 301 540 2286
2007 L 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 11
C 162 106 694 49 318 517 114 52 2012
2008 L 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 14
C 145 100 104 282 573 34 256 440 156 51 2141
2009 L 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 20
C 119 100 88 221 430 60 60 26 84 204 353 87 1832
2010 L 3 2 4 3 1 2 1 16
C 141 106 274 572 248 111 46 1498
2011 L 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 17
C 105 104 273 577 80 33 88 462 178 49 47 1996
2012 L 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 14
C 98 107 275 574 36 263 499 107 48 2007
2013 L 2 2 4 4 2 3 2 3 1 23
C 152 112 293 587 83 287 542 191 103 2350
2014 L 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 15
C 100 46 349 637 119 322 591 220 58 2442
2015 L 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 10
C 43 392 599 333 392 217 61 2037
2016 L 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 13
C 105 381 560 81 329 564 223 53 2296
2017 L 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 21
C 121 99 106 388 576 95 115 330 608 224 88 62 2812
2018 L 1 2 2 2 1 8
C 103 221 401 429 28 1182
Panel B: De-listings
2006 D 2 1 2 2 2 9
C 106 109 682 300 541 1738
2007 D 1 2 3
C 318 518 836
2008 D 1 1 1 3
C 282 574 256 1112
2009 D 1 1 1 3
C 224 431 355 1010
2010 D 4 2 1 1 8
C 274 573 248 46 1141
2011 D 1 1 2
C 464 49 513
2012 D 2 2 4 2 2 1 2 15
C 97 275 573 35 264 499 106 1849
2013 D 1 5 3 1 3 13
C 113 292 588 84 541 1618
2014 D 1 1 1 3
C 349 323 58 730
2015 D 1 1 4 1 1 8
C 43 106 596 592 218 1555
2016 D 1 1 2 1 1 6
C 106 381 560 516 53 1616
2017 D 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 10
C 120 106 389 578 331 609 225 2358
2018 D 2 2 2 6
C 57 221 429 707
Notes: Numbers represent the number of firms included in the full sample for the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns.
L is used in Panel A to denote the number of firms joining the DJSI in the given year, with D used to denote the number of
de-listings in Panel B. In both panels C denotes the numbers of controls. Totals are provided for each year. 2005 has more
joining firms because this was the year that the DJSI North America was formed and numbers of listed firms in North
America thus increased to populate the regional list. Numbers reflect those industry-years for which there is sufficient share
price data, and for which assets are listed for the preceding financial year.
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2.2 Reduced Sample
Amongst the full sample are a number of firms who are significantly smaller than any of those who are
members of the DJSI. This creates a potential bias in the comparison due to the well studied size anomaly10.
Consequently a further control is placed upon firms that ensures the control set is more directly comparable
with the treated set. Here a reduced sample is constructed using only those firms who have assets of at
least 80% of those of the smallest firm that joins the DJSI in that year. By imposing this restriction we
significantly reduce the number of shares available to serve as comparators, but are able to minimise the
impact of size. Alternative thresholds could be considered, but with the contribution of this paper stemming
from an approach that does not require sample size reduction robustness of the results in Section 3 to
minimum size is taken as given from the papers advocating those approaches.
In the discussion of established modelling methodologies we present both the base sample and full sample,
but do not use the base sample for the generalised synthetic control approach.
2.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Evaluation of the effect of changes in a firm’s DJSI listing status is based upon the ability of membership to
generate returns which differ from those that might have been expected in the event that the firm did not
receive the listing. This may be achieved either by comparing new entrants with similar firms that are not
joining the DJSI that year, or by comparing de-listing firms with others who are not exiting the DJSI that
year. However, it is more usefully considered as the difference between the observed returns and those that
would have been realised had pricing behaviour of the listed firms share continued in the same way as it had
been doing during the control period.
Simplest of the models to study the cross section of stock returns is the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) as introduced through the works of Lintner (1965); Sharpe (1964) and Treynor (1962). Although
subsequent advancements of the CAPM are able to generate better fit for future returns predictions it is
widely accepted that the CAPM is the most parsimonious solution for out-of-sample prediction [**** ADD
CAMPBELL] (Acemoglu et al., 2016). Before proceeding note that in all that follows we could add an
additional y subscript to recognise that all estimation and prediction applies to a specific year and that there
are multiple years in the dataset. For the control period, t ∈ [Tstart, Tend], we estimate equation (1) using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This is done for all firms in the sample individually.
Rit = αi + βiMKTt (1)
In equation (1) Rit is the excess return on share i at time t, MKTt is the Fama-French excess return for
the market at time t, and αi and βi are the coefficients of interest. Estimated values αˆi and βˆi are then
used to compute the fitted excess returns for share i, Rˆit. The abnormal return, ARit, is then defined as the
difference between fitted and observed values:
ARit = Rit − αˆi − βˆiMKTt (2)
Consequently a subperiod t ∈ [t, t¯] has cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)s of:
CARi[t, t¯] =
t¯∑
t=t
ARit (3)
Investors have natural interest in obtaining abnormal returns, with higher absolute values being most at-
tention grabbing. If correctly priced the CAR would be zero and hence the relationship between CARs and
DJSI status becomes of interest.
This paper contrasts these simple abnormal returns with those generated by the synthetic control family.
For this purpose we employ the mean square predicted error (MSPE) within the control period as a measure
of model fit. For any given share i the MSPE over the Tc trading day interval [Tstart, Tend] is given by
10See Keim (1983) for a review of the work that established this anomaly within the asset pricing literature.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Full Sample (Listing)
Mean Min 25th pctile Median 75th pctile Max St. dev. N
(1) DJSI 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.089 23952
(2) Size 7.392 1.548 6.053 7.284 8.535 14.76 1.850 23592
(3) Profitability 0.088 -11.71 0.045 0.101 0.167 13.65 7.003 22458
(4) Leverage 0.432 -24.78 0.150 0.391 0.651 11.55 0.536 23291
(5) CAR[1,16] 0.115 -89.18 -4.146 -0.324 3.743 128.1 8.795 23592
(6) CAR[1,21] 0.144 -81.00 -4.735 -0.261 4.422 120.0 9.963 23592
(7) CAR[16,21] 0.083 -94.76 -2.252 -0.025 2.331 126.2 5.182 23592
(8) CAR[16,36] -0.047 -112.1 -4.823 0.060 4.906 151.7 10.42 23592
(9) CAR[21,36] -0.180 -97.76 -4.218 -0.027 4.053 165.4 9.073 23592
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Base Sample (Listing)
(10) DJSI 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.197 4020
(11) Size 9.728 6.617 8.678 9.556 10.54 14.76 1.552 4020
(12) Profitability 0.142 -2.115 0.068 0.123 0.196 5.279 0.228 3888
(13) Leverage -0.180 -13.38 0.352 0.504 0.724 8.369 0.405 3949
Panel C: Univariate sample comparisons (Listing)
Full Sample Base Sample
List Other Diff. List Other Diff.
(14) Size 10.02 7.370 2.650*** Size 10.02 9.713 0.307**
(15) Profitability 0.196 0.087 0.109*** Profitability 0.196 0.139 0.057
(16) Leverage 0.524 0.431 0.093*** Leverage 0.524 0.434 0.090
Panel D: Correlations (Listing)
Full Sample Base Sample
DJSI Size Profit Leverage DJSI Size Profit Leverage
(17) DJSI 1 1
(18) Size 0.131 1 0.045 1
(19) Profit 0.031 0.149 1 0.060 0.042 1
(20) Leverage 0.027 0.504 0.056 1 -0.013 0.274 0.041 1
Panel E: Summary Statistics for Full Sample (De-Listing)
Mean Min 25th pctile Median 75th pctile Max St. dev. N
(21) DJSIX 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.078 16746
(22) Size 7.502 1.748 6.160 7.400 8.649 14.76 1.854 16746
(23) Profitability 0.073 -21.62 0.036 0.093 0.159 7.003 0.371 16746
(24) Leverage 0.432 0.000 0.172 0.411 0.654 0.999 0.293 16746
(25) CAR[1,16] 0.336 -68.41 -4.110 -0.161 3.993 140.9 8.943 16746
(26) CAR[1,21] 0.269 -66.69 -4.621 -0.137 4.560 124.0 10.00 16746
(27) CAR[16,21] -0.095 -68.43 -2.490 -0.067 2.341 111.6 5.232 16746
(28) CAR[16,36] -0.190 -112.7 -4.816 0.139 4.867 152.7 10.59 16746
(29) CAR[21,36] -0.219 -98.53 -4.074 0.209 4.167 167.6 9.411 16746
Panel F: Summary Statistics for Base Sample (De-Listing)
(30) DJSIX 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 0.195 2612
(31) Size 10.05 7.245 9.057 9.924 10.82 14.76 1.367 2612
(32) Profitability 0.135 -1.235 0.062 0.114 0.193 5.279 0.239 2612
(33) Leverage 0.536 0.006 0.363 0.517 0.726 0.995 0.079 2612
Panel G: Univariate sample comparisons (De-Listing)
Full Sample Base Sample
List Other Diff. List Other Diff.
(34) Size 10.83 7.500 3.329*** Size 10.83 10.05 0.784*
(35) Profitability 0.157 0.073 0.084 Profitability 0.157 0.153 0.022
(36) Leverage 0.565 0.432 0.133* Leverage 0.565 0.536 0.029
Panel H: Correlations (De-Listing)
Full Sample Base Sample
DJSIX Size Profit Leverage DJSIX Size Profit Leverage
(37) DJSIX 1 1
(38) Size 0.119 1 0.037 1
(39) Profit 0.025 0.146 1 0.047 0.005 1
(40) Leverage 0.026 0.503 0.045 1 -0.006 0.235 0.009 1
Notes: Descriptive statistics for variables used in main analyses. Samples are restricted by two digit NAICS code to those
industries with one or more firm joining the DJSI within a given year. Full sample includes all firms listed on the major
American stock exchanges with sufficient data, with the base sample considering only those with assets at least 80% as large
as the smallest joining firm in their industry. All stock data is sourced from CRSP. DJSI listing data is taken from Robecco
SAM. Size (log assets), profitability(return on equity) and leverage (ratio of total debt to total capital) are sourced from
Compustat. Significance given by * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
equation (4).
MSPEi =
1
Tc
Tend∑
t=Tstart
AR2it (4)
Construction of the abnormal returns for the generalised synthetic control involves taking the difference
between observed returns and those of the counterfactual version of that share. Consequently comparison
can only be done on those shares considered “treated” by listing to, or being de-listed from, the DJSI. In the
subsequent sections we report the CAPM CARs at an aggregate level and broken down by industry-year for
those joining firms. Note further that because those announced as either gaining listing on, or being de-listed
from, the DJSI are included in both the full and base samples there is no distinction between samples in the
later reporting.
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2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics in Table 2 remind just how few firms obtain listing within any given year; just 0.8%
of all observations represent listings. Focusing only on larger firms in Panel B that figure rises to 4.7%, but
this is still low relative to the overall volume of data. A full breakdown of the entrants by NAICS2 code
is provided in Table ??. Rows (2) to (4) provide some statistics for three key firm characteristics. Size,
measured as the log of total assets, shows that firms within the full sample are drawn from a wide ranging
distribution. This diversity is the motivation for the reduction in the sample. The base sample has a much
higher average and a minimum value close to the median of the full sample. Profitability, captured as the
return on equity, in rows (3) and (12), is also wide ranging with a number of firms reporting losses in both
samples. Once the minimum size requirement is imposed the minimum ROE is much larger. Leverage also
has a smaller range amongst the largest firms. Comparison of means on rows (4) and (13) verify this pattern.
Focus in this paper is on the abnormal returns, if any, gained when entering the DJSI. For this purpose
CAR are used, calculated using (3). For the full sample, rows (5) to (9) give values for five periods of
interest. From the start of the treatment period to announcement date, days 1 to 16, we note a small
positive abnormal return of 0.115% amongst the whole sample. From the first day to the effective day this
average has increased to 0.144%. Within the week from announcement date to the effective date there are
thus positive abnormal returns to be had. Row (7) shows these to be 0.083%. Looking at periods beginning
on the two key listing dates, announcement on day 16 and effective on day 21, to the end of the sample
the CARs are -0.047% and -0.180% on average. From the positive pre-announcement and negative post
effective date in particular we see much of the pre-announcement and correction effects discussed within the
literature. As these figures contain all firms they remind that there will be many more stories behind the
results, and that it is not possible to attribute all of these changes to the DJSI listings.
Univariate tests in Panel C inform on the differences between those firms who join the DJSI and the
control groups for that given year. These are aggregated into a large list and tested for equality of mean
between the joining and non-joining samples. In both the full sample and the base sample the firms joining
the list are significantly larger, this result remains even when the restriction based on size has been imposed.
Looking at profitability the joining firms have a significantly higher ROE than the non-joiners; this would be
consistent with the broad observation that improving CSR is costly and therefore typically only practised by
firms who have the profitability to support such measures. After reducing the sample to the base, the average
ROE for control firms rises but the gap between treatment and control is no longer significant. Finally, we
see that amongst the whole sample firms joining the DJSI have a higher debt to capital ratio, but in the base
sample it is the non-joining firms who have the higher leverage. The latter difference is also not significant
however. It is therefore suggested that the largest firms with the greater profitability and ability to raise
their leverage to fund investment in projects which will raise sustainability performance, who are most likely
to join.
Panel D addresses the correlations between the data. Leverage and size are the most correlated, but fall
short of the 0.7 threshold usually assumed to be a concern for multicollinearity. For the base sample the
correlations between the three financial variables drop significantly. Correlations between DJSI listing and
all three controls are low in both the full, and base, samples. Thus in any regression contexts where these
variables feature we can have confidence in the inference gained.
Relative to the listing sample the de-listing sample is much smaller, there are just 16746 firm-years instead
of the previous 23592. A de-listing proportion of just 0.6% is lower than the 0.8% joining proportion. Since
its’ inception in 2005 the DJSI North America has been growing in numbers; a larger proportion of joining
firms is therefore to be expected. Summary statistics for firm characteristics in rows (22) to (24) are very
similar to those in Panel A, the de-listing sample being slightly larger, slightly less profitable but being of
identical leverage on average. Comparing the CARs for the periods summarised in lines (25) to (29), shows
that those firms which are to leave the market return an average of 0.336% prior to the announcement
compared to just 0.115% for those destined to gain listing. Negative effects post listing are also larger in
absolute value for the de-listing group. Biggest contrast comes in the period between announcement day
and the day the changes become effective. Returns between announcement and effective dates in the listing
case were 0.083% whilst the de-listing set showed losses at 0.095%. Because there is great variation across
years and firms it is not instructive to read deeply into this, but there is a suggestion of listing and de-listing
moving in the opposite directions as intuition would suggest. Reducing the sample to consider only those
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control firms with assets of at least 80% of those of the smallest firm that gets de-listed in their industry-year
produces a set of just 2612 observations. Summary statistics for this base sample, lines (30) to (33), have
similar properties to those for the listing case (lines 10-13).
T-tests of firm characteristics between de-listed firms and their respective controls indicate that those
leaving the DJSI were larger and more highly leveraged than others. Unlike the listing case there is no
significance to the profitability differential. Combined with the lower average, 0.157 for de-listing firms
versus 0.196 for those joining, there is indication towards the greater profitability of being seen as a CSR
leader through the recognition afforded by remaining a DJSI member. Such is only indicative since it relies
on consumers knowing in the previous financial year that the de-listed firms were not performing as strongly
as those who were to gain listing11. Panel G further shows that even after reduction to the Base Sample
size differentials are still significant. Correlation statistics in Panel H again urge caution on the relationship
between size and leverage. In all tests performed on the regressions this is not seen as a problem to the
reliability of the results that follow; maximum correlation is again shy of the 0.7 that would be problematic,
for example.
3 DJSI Membership and Stock Returns
Identification of membership effects to date has relied on the comparison of samples or a dummy variable
regression approach. Our preliminary discussion thus considers these two approaches, presenting univariate
tests of equality in returns and CAR for periods surrounding the DJSI listing announcement date. Event
studies proceed in this way, but may opt to perform matching between samples prior to conducting the
univariate tests. For this reference case we maintain the maximal set of data and do not exclude firms for
which sufficient data is available. Second we consider common company financial variables that have been
linked to stock returns. Thus, in the spirit of Acemoglu et al. (2016) we identify a measure of the listing, and
de-listing, effects which controls for these typically considered determinants. Both approaches corroborate
the inconclusiveness identified within the literature.
3.1 Two-Sample Approach
Identifying listing effects by comparing samples of firms entering the DJSI with their peers reveals many of
the already identified phenomenon. First we consider the posted excess returns for the share sample. Whilst
not accounting for past performance these do deliver the most direct outward impression of the performance
of the shares of the new entrants to the DJSI. Compared to larger firms new entrants deliver significantly
lower returns on day 9, 5 trading days prior to the announcement. On the announcement day listed firms
offer a return 0.3% higher than non-listed and 0.2% higher than the largest control firms. Only a lower
abnomral return on days 20 and 36 for newly listed firms compared to all others is significant. Such a lack of
impact is suggestive that the CAPM model is pricing the DJSI listed firms with reasonable accuracy. Event
studies have spoken of the positive pre-announcement effect and for those firms who are to gain listing we
do see evidence of such here, although many of the positive differences are not significant.
In the delisting effect there is more significance particular further away from the key announcement and
effective dates. Attributing this to the DJSI is harder, but this is a difference between de-listed firms and
others. That the effect is of a similar magnitude when comparing with large firms as it is when comparing with
the full sample means it is not a size related effect. Moving into the period a week before the announcement
there are no significant differentials between those who will be dropped from the index and any of the control
groups. A positive effect here can be aligned to the traditionalist perspective that CSR is an expensive luxury
for firms that is better reduced. Higher profitability would be expected from de-listing and therefore this
uptick is consistent with expectation of better future performance post delisting. There is some evidence
of a correction effect moving against these positive returns; values are similar in the delisting columns as
11Consider the chronological ordering required. CSR reputation is observed by consumers who then make purchasing decisions
accordingly. These purchasing decisions affect sales, and hence profits. To be recognised within the data here such changes would
have to be seen in the financial variables more than nine months before the announcement is made. Such is not unreasonable
since in many industries it is possible to know who the likely listees will be, or who the de-listed firms are likely to be, well ahead.
Such a chronology may thus not be universal and so the temptation to generalise the motivation for the varied profitability is
left as an intuition.
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Table 3: Univariate Tests of Return Equality
Day Listing Delisting
DJSI+ All firms Base Sample DJSI− All firms Base Sample
Return Return Diff Return Diff Return Return Diff Return Diff
1 -0.010 0.145 -0.155 0.031 -0.041 -0.129 0.188 -0.316*** 0.011 -0.139
2 0.086 -0.03 0.115 -0.019 0.105 -0.214 -0.012 -0.202* -0.068 -0.146
3 0.012 0.077 -0.065 -0.071 0.083 -0.160 0.095 -0.256** -0.014 -0.146
4 -0.049 -0.113 0.064 -0.074 0.025 0.039 -0.201 0.239** -0.217 0.255**
5 -0.078 -0.016 -0.062 -0.019 -0.058 -0.085 -0.035 -0.049 0.036 -0.120
6 0.049 0.061 -0.012 -0.009 0.058 -0.073 0.079 -0.152 0.011 -0.084
7 -0.11 0.022 -0.132 -0.087 -0.023 0.189 0.091 0.098 -0.154 0.342***
8 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.013 0.002 0.044 0.073 -0.029 0.047 -0.003
9 0.129 -0.111 0.239* 0.011 0.118 0.230 -0.161 0.392*** -0.096 0.327**
10 0.066 -0.034 0.099 0.029 0.036 0.180 -0.001 0.182 0.044 0.136
11 0.095 0.114 -0.019 -0.001 0.096 0.071 0.170 -0.099 -0.044 0.115
12 -0.195 -0.05 -0.145 -0.103 -0.092 0.017 -0.028 0.044 -0.135 0.152
13 -0.04 0.057 -0.096 0.073 -0.113 0.048 0.183 -0.135 -0.036 0.084
14 -0.198 -0.095 -0.104 -0.114 -0.085 -0.120 -0.098 -0.022 -0.182 0.061
15 0.077 0.07 0.007 0.076 0.001 -0.121 0.024 -0.145 -0.139 0.018
ANN 0.236 -0.064 0.299*** 0.01 0.226** 0.033 -0.147 0.180 -0.104 0.137
17 -0.046 -0.133 0.087 -0.145 0.099 0.226 -0.068 0.184 0.106 0.010
18 0.086 -0.003 0.09 0.091 -0.004 -0.043 -0.133 0.090 -0.016 -0.026
19 0.095 -0.064 0.159 -0.035 0.131 -0.091 -0.050 -0.041 -0.108 0.016
20 0.010 0.268 -0.258* 0.050 -0.041 -0.006 0.426 -0.432** 0.053 -0.058
21 -0.075 -0.086 0.01 -0.055 -0.020 0.017 -0.125 0.142 -0.002 0.019
22 -0.174 -0.071 -0.103 0.008 -0.182 0.054 -0.109 0.163 0.016 0.039
23 0.001 0.092 -0.090 -0.146 0.147 -0.135 0.155 -0.290 -0.044 -0.092
24 -0.031 -0.088 0.057 -0.114 0.083 0.111 0.008 0.103 -0.057 0.168
25 -0.089 0.009 -0.098 -0.050 -0.039 -0.108 -0.041 -0.066 -0.005 -0.103
26 -0.076 -0.027 -0.049 -0.019 -0.057 0.139 0.062 0.077 -0.002 0.140
27 -0.033 -0.099 0.066 0.030 -0.063 0.012 -0.056 0.068 0.018 -0.006
28 -0.162 0.036 -0.198 0.006 -0.168 0.354 0.034 0.320* 0.020 0.334**
29 0.035 0.168 -0.133 0.029 0.006 -0.006 0.260 -0.266* -0.109 0.103
30 -0.059 -0.169 0.111 -0.089 0.031 -0.303 -0.173 -0.131 0.079 -0.382
31 -0.171 0.014 -0.186 -0.051 -0.120 -0.149 0.047 -0.196 0.042 -0.191
32 0.003 -0.037 0.039 -0.081 0.084 0.001 0.012 -0.011 0.009 -0.008
33 -0.021 0.071 -0.092 -0.122 0.101 -0.045 0.188 -0.233 0.024 -0.069
34 0.123 -0.123 0.246 -0.084 0.207 0.432 -0.221 0.653*** 0.029 0.403**
35 0.021 -0.131 0.152 -0.164 0.185 0.008 -0.177 0.185 -0.079 0.087
36 -0.102 0.100 -0.202* -0.021 -0.081 -0.202 -0.084 -0.118 -0.278 0.076
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated based on the difference between realised excess returns and the fitted value using
coefficients estimated individually for each firm during the control period. DJSI+ refers to firms which join the DJSI,
DJSI− being those who are de-listed. All firms include any share listed on the major US exchanges from the same industry
as a joining firm, with large firms including only those with assets 80% of those of the smallest new entrant to/exiting firm
from the DJSI. Evaluation processes are repeated annually such that reported figures represent the average effect across the
period. In the returns case period represents the trading day for which the returns are reported. Diff reports the difference
between the treated firms, listed or de-listed, and the untreated firms in the appropriate sample. Asterisks denote significance
levels of a two-tailed t-test (*** - 1%, ** - 5% and * - 1%).
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they are in the listing case. Contrasts between the two change directions are stark but should not be viewed
as demonstrative of a lack of appreciation of the role of DJSI membership. Heterogeneities in investor
attitude are manifesting through revisionists driving returns on listed firms up and others who favour the
traditionalist perspective being behind the boost to de-listing firms. Coexistence of the two effects is in line
with Oberndorfer et al. (2013).
CARs, discussed in Table 4 recognise the trend in the stocks performance prior to the listing, they offer
a measure of how listing creates deviation from that pre-announcement path. For the stated start and end
dates we test whether the CARs of a pooled sample of listed firms are equal to that of a pooled sample of
non-listed firms over the whole fourteen years of data. Positive values signify that the recently DJSI listed
firms are offering higher CARs. From dates in the table range from day one of the treatment period through
to the day after changes become effective, whilst the end dates range from day 11 to the final day of the
treatment period. Full results are reported in the appendix. Panel (a) shows that there are some positive
CARs for samples starting a week before the announcement. Between announcement date and the date that
changes become effective, CARs are significant and positive. Herein an opportunity for investors to profit
is found. Around the effective date there is a correction. CARs that start on day 20, one day prior to the
effective date, show significant negative CARs. Throughout the post effective date range we see negative
CARs but few others are significant. When we focus only on the base sample the only notable significance
that remains is the positive return surrounding the announcement date. Understandably the magnitude of
these gains is smaller, but their continued existence merits further investigation.
Turning to de-listing effects, Table ?? may be sat neatly in contrast to Table 5 from the listing analysis.
Immediate observations are the greater magnitudes of the CARs and the increased number of holding periods
for which significance of the CARs is noted. Strong evidence of a pre-announcement effect is provided in
those groups starting on days 7 to 9 of the treatment period and ending on days 9 to 12. This is far more
pronounced than that seen in Table 5. That both effects are positive raises questions about the role of
the pre-announcement effect; investors may be thinking that these firms would retain listing. Around the
announcement date itself there are few significant effects but early gains quickly give way to negative CARs
as the correction effect kicks in. Note here that the smaller magnitude of gains through the period before
the effective date means the corrections are smaller than those observed in Table 5.
For the Base Sample the comparison between listing and de-listing is more stark. Picking up those shares
that are to be de-listed offers higher CARs over large time ranges, provided the purchase of the shares
takes place at least a week before the announcement date. Waiting until the announcement date offers little
difference and hence any investor looking to take advantage would need to correctly identify those firms
who were to de-list. From a trading perspective obtaining de-listed firms in the immediate aftermath of the
announcement offers the highest probability of success; such shares offer a premium, albeit an insignificant
one, in the base sample too.
3.2 OLS Regressions
To understand better the extent to which factors lie behind the observed CAR patterns we regress the CARs
observed over five sub-periods from Table 2 on the listing dummy, size, profitability and leverage. We study
CARi[from, to] as the dependent variable, where this is either CARi[−15, 1], CARi[−15, 15], CARi[−1, 1],
CARi[0] and CARi[0, 10]. Regression is performed following equation (5):
CARi[from, to] = α+ βDJSIDJSI
+
iy + θXiy + γj + ψy + iy (5)
Here Xiy is the set of firm level covariates, DJSI
+
iy is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i joins the DJSI in year
y. β is a vector of coefficients on the firm controls. γj introduces fixed effects for industries where firm i is
in industry j. These fixed effects are incorporated to capture unobserved heterogeneity between industries,
enabling the model to include any factors which act solely upon that sector. For the de-listing case the
dummy for firm i leaving the DJSI in year y is DJSI−iy. ψy is the year fixed effect that is added to represent
the variation in conditions over time, this includes those which would have been brought about during the
GFC. Remaining error terms, iy, are assumed to have constant variance and an expected value of 0. To
address questions about the best choice of covariates, or whether they should enter linearly, quadratically
or otherwise, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2016) to allow each of the three controls to enter as linear, squared
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Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns t-test Summaries: Listing
Panel (a): Full Sample (N = 22458):
From/To 11 12 13 14 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF
1 0.065 -0.08 -0.176 -0.28 -0.273 0.026 0.113 0.202 0.362 0.104 0.114
2 0.22 0.075 -0.021 -0.125 -0.118 0.181 0.268 0.358 0.517 0.259 0.269
3 0.104 -0.04 -0.137 -0.24 -0.234 0.066 0.152 0.242 0.402 0.144 0.154
4 0.17 0.025 -0.071 -0.175 -0.168 0.131 0.218 0.308 0.467 0.209 0.219
5 0.106 -0.039 -0.135 -0.239 -0.232 0.067 0.154 0.244 0.403 0.145 0.155
6 0.168 0.023 -0.073 -0.177 -0.17 0.129 0.216 0.306 0.465 0.207 0.217
7 0.179 0.035 -0.062 -0.165 -0.159 0.141 0.228 0.317 0.477 0.219 0.229
8 0.312 0.167 0.071 -0.033 -0.026 0.273 0.36 0.45 0.609* 0.351 0.361
9 0.32* 0.175 0.079 -0.025 -0.018 0.281 0.368 0.458 0.617* 0.359 0.37
10 0.081 -0.064 -0.16 -0.264 -0.257 0.042 0.129 0.219 0.378 0.12 0.131
11 -0.019 -0.163 -0.26 -0.363 -0.357 -0.057 0.03 0.119 0.279 0.021 0.031
12 -0.145 -0.241 -0.345* -0.338 -0.038 0.048 0.138 0.297 0.039 0.05
13 -0.096 -0.2 -0.193 0.106 0.193 0.283 0.442 0.184 0.194
14 -0.104 -0.097 0.203 0.289 0.379* 0.538* 0.28 0.291
15 0.007 0.306* 0.393** 0.483** 0.642*** 0.384 0.394
ANN 0.299*** 0.386*** 0.476*** 0.635*** 0.377 0.388
17 0.087 0.176 0.336* 0.078 0.088
18 0.09 0.249 -0.009 0.002
19 0.159 -0.099 -0.088
20 -0.258* -0.247*
EFF 0.01
From/To EFF 22 24 26 31 36
11 0.031 -0.072 -0.105 -0.253 -0.593 -0.449
12 0.05 -0.053 -0.087 -0.235 -0.574 -0.43
13 0.194 0.091 0.058 -0.090 -0.429 -0.286
14 0.291 0.188 0.154 0.006 -0.333 -0.189
15 0.394 0.291 0.258 0.110 -0.229 -0.086
ANN 0.388 0.284 0.251 0.103 -0.236 -0.092
17 0.088 -0.015 -0.048 -0.196 -0.536 -0.392
18 0.002 -0.102 -0.135 -0.283 -0.622 -0.479
19 -0.088 -0.191 -0.225 -0.372 -0.712 -0.568
20 -0.247* -0.351* -0.384 -0.532 -0.871* -0.728
EFF 0.010 -0.093 -0.126 -0.274 -0.613 -0.470
22 -0.103 -0.136 -0.284 -0.624 -0.480
Panel (b): Base Sample (N = 3888):
From /To 11 12 13 14 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF
1 0.4 0.308 0.196 0.111 0.112 0.337 0.437 0.432 0.563 0.522 0.502
2 0.441 0.349 0.237 0.152 0.153 0.378 0.478 0.473 0.604 0.563 0.543
3 0.336 0.244 0.132 0.047 0.048 0.273 0.373 0.368 0.499 0.458 0.438
4 0.253 0.162 0.049 -0.036 -0.035 0.191 0.29 0.286 0.416 0.376 0.356
5 0.229 0.137 0.024 -0.06 -0.06 0.166 0.265 0.261 0.392 0.351 0.331
6 0.287 0.195 0.083 -0.002 -0.001 0.224 0.324 0.319 0.45 0.409 0.389
7 0.229 0.138 0.025 -0.06 -0.059 0.167 0.266 0.262 0.392 0.352 0.331
8 0.252 0.161 0.048 -0.037 -0.036 0.19 0.289 0.285 0.415 0.375 0.354
9 0.25 0.158 0.046 -0.039 -0.038 0.187 0.287 0.282 0.413 0.372 0.352
10 0.132 0.041 -0.072 -0.157 -0.156 0.07 0.169 0.165 0.295 0.255 0.234
11 0.096 0.004 -0.109 -0.193 -0.193 0.033 0.132 0.128 0.259 0.218 0.198
12 -0.092 -0.205 -0.289 -0.289 -0.063 0.036 0.032 0.163 0.122 0.102
13 -0.113 -0.197 -0.197 0.029 0.128 0.124 0.255 0.214 0.194
14 -0.085 -0.084 0.142 0.241 0.237 0.368 0.327 0.307
15 0.001 0.226 0.326* 0.321* 0.452* 0.411 0.391
ANN 0.226** 0.325** 0.321* 0.452* 0.411 0.391
17 0.099 0.095 0.226 0.185 0.165
18 -0.004 0.127 0.086 0.066
19 0.131 0.09 0.07
20 -0.041 -0.061
EFF -0.02
EFF 22 24 26 31 36
11 0.198 0.016 0.246 0.150 -0.164 0.331
12 0.102 -0.080 0.150 0.054 -0.26 0.236
13 0.194 0.012 0.242 0.146 -0.168 0.327
14 0.307 0.125 0.355 0.259 -0.055 0.44
15 0.391 0.210 0.440 0.344 0.03 0.525
ANN 0.391 0.209 0.439 0.343 0.029 0.524
17 0.165 -0.017 0.213 0.117 -0.197 0.298
18 0.066 -0.116 0.114 0.018 -0.296 0.199
19 0.07 -0.112 0.118 0.022 -0.292 0.203
20 -0.061 -0.243 -0.013 -0.109 -0.423 0.073
EFF -0.020 -0.202 0.028 -0.068 -0.382 0.113
22 -0.182 0.048 -0.048 -0.362 0.133
Notes: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the fitted values from the CAPM. Full Sample includes all firms
that did not join the DJSI in any industry-year where one or more firms did join. Base Sample restricts the full sample to
include all joining firms and only those non-joining firms with an asset holding at least 80% of that of the lowest entrant in
their industry-year. Significance given for a two-sample t-test of equality between joining and non-joining firms, with * - 5%,
** - 1%, *** - 0.1%
13
Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns t-test Summaries: De-Listing
Panel (a): Full Sample (N = 16747):
From/To 11 12 13 14 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF
1 -0.193 -0.148 -0.284 -0.305 -0.45 -0.271 -0.087 0.004 -0.038 -0.47 -0.328
2 0.124 0.168 0.033 0.011 -0.134 0.046 0.230 0.320 0.279 -0.153 -0.011
3 0.325 0.37 0.234 0.213 0.068 0.247 0.431 0.522 0.48 0.048 0.190
4 0.581 0.625 0.49 0.468 0.323 0.503 0.687 0.777 0.736 0.304 0.446
5 0.342 0.386 0.251 0.229 0.084 0.264 0.448 0.538 0.497 0.065 0.207
6 0.391 0.435 0.3 0.278 0.133 0.313 0.497 0.587 0.546 0.114 0.256
7 0.543* 0.587* 0.452 0.43 0.285 0.465 0.649 0.739* 0.698* 0.266 0.408
8 0.445* 0.489 0.354 0.332 0.187 0.367 0.551 0.641 0.6 0.168 0.310
9 0.474** 0.518* 0.383 0.361 0.216 0.396 0.58 0.67 0.629 0.197 0.339
10 0.082 0.127 -0.008 -0.030 -0.175 0.004 0.188 0.279 0.237 -0.195 -0.053
11 -0.099 -0.055 -0.190 -0.212 -0.357 -0.177 0.007 0.097 0.056 -0.376 -0.234
12 0.044 -0.091 -0.113 -0.258 -0.078 0.106 0.196 0.155 -0.277 -0.135
13 -0.135 -0.157 -0.302 -0.122 0.062 0.152 0.111 -0.321 -0.179
14 -0.022 -0.167 0.013 0.197 0.287 0.246 -0.186 -0.044
15 -0.145 0.035 0.219 0.309 0.268 -0.164 -0.022
ANN 0.180 0.364** 0.454** 0.413 -0.019 0.122
17 0.184 0.274 0.233 -0.199 -0.057
18 0.09 0.049 -0.383 -0.241
19 -0.041 -0.473** -0.331
20 -0.432*** -0.290
EFF 0.142
From/To EFF 22 24 26 31 36
11 -0.234 -0.071 -0.361 -0.248 -0.453 0.024
12 -0.135 0.028 -0.262 -0.149 -0.353 0.123
13 -0.179 -0.017 -0.307 -0.193 -0.398 0.079
14 -0.044 0.119 -0.171 -0.058 -0.263 0.214
15 -0.022 0.14 -0.15 -0.036 -0.241 0.236
ANN 0.122 0.285 -0.005 0.109 -0.096 0.381
17 -0.057 0.106 -0.184 -0.071 -0.276 0.201
18 -0.241 -0.078 -0.368 -0.255 -0.459 0.017
19 -0.331 -0.169 -0.459 -0.345 -0.55 -0.073
20 -0.290 -0.127 -0.417 -0.304 -0.508 -0.032
EFF 0.142 0.305 0.015 0.128 -0.076 0.400
22 0.163 -0.127 -0.014 -0.218 0.258
Panel (b): Base Sample (N = 2612):
From/To 11 12 13 14 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF
1 0.538 0.690 0.774 0.835 0.853 0.991* 1.000* 0.974* 0.990* 0.932 0.951*
2 0.677 0.830* 0.913* 0.975** 0.993** 1.130** 1.140** 1.113** 1.130** 1.071* 1.090**
3 0.823** 0.975** 1.059** 1.120** 1.138** 1.276*** 1.285** 1.259** 1.276** 1.217** 1.236**
4 0.969*** 1.121*** 1.205*** 1.266*** 1.285*** 1.422*** 1.432*** 1.405*** 1.422*** 1.363** 1.382***
5 0.714** 0.866** 0.95** 1.011** 1.029** 1.166*** 1.176*** 1.15** 1.166** 1.108** 1.127**
6 0.834** 0.986*** 1.07*** 1.131*** 1.15*** 1.287*** 1.297*** 1.27*** 1.287*** 1.228*** 1.247***
7 0.918*** 1.07*** 1.153*** 1.215*** 1.233*** 1.370*** 1.380*** 1.354*** 1.370*** 1.312*** 1.330***
8 0.575** 0.728** 0.811** 0.873** 0.891** 1.028** 1.038*** 1.011** 1.028** 0.969** 0.988**
9 0.578** 0.73** 0.814** 0.875** 0.893** 1.031*** 1.040*** 1.014** 1.030** 0.972** 0.991**
10 0.251 0.403* 0.487* 0.548* 0.567* 0.704** 0.714** 0.687* 0.704* 0.645 0.664
11 0.115 0.267 0.351 0.412 0.431 0.568* 0.578* 0.551 0.568 0.509 0.528
12 0.152 0.236 0.297 0.316 0.453 0.463 0.436 0.453 0.394 0.413
13 0.084 0.145 0.163 0.301 0.31 0.284 0.3 0.242 0.261
14 0.061 0.08 0.217 0.227 0.2 0.217 0.158 0.177
15 0.018 0.156 0.165 0.139 0.155 0.097 0.116
16 0.137 0.147 0.121 0.137 0.079 0.097
17 0.010 -0.017 0.000 -0.059 -0.040
18 -0.026 -0.010 -0.068 -0.050
19 0.016 -0.042 -0.023
20 -0.058 -0.040
EFF 0.019
From/To ANN 22 24 26 31 36
11 0.528 0.567 0.475 0.681 0.539 1.027
12 0.413 0.452 0.36 0.566 0.424 0.912
13 0.261 0.299 0.208 0.414 0.271 0.760
14 0.177 0.216 0.124 0.33 0.188 0.676
15 0.116 0.154 0.063 0.269 0.126 0.615
ANN 0.097 0.136 0.044 0.251 0.108 0.597
17 -0.040 -0.001 -0.093 0.113 -0.029 0.459
18 -0.050 -0.011 -0.103 0.104 -0.039 0.450
19 -0.023 0.015 -0.076 0.13 -0.013 0.476
20 -0.040 -0.001 -0.093 0.113 -0.029 0.459
EFF 0.019 0.057 -0.034 0.172 0.03 0.518
22 0.039 -0.053 0.153 0.011 0.499
Notes: Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the fitted values from the CAPM. Full Sample includes all firms
that were not de-listed from the DJSI in any industry-year where one or more firms were de-listed. Base Sample restricts the
full sample to include all listed firms and only those other firms with an asset holding at least 80% of that of the lowest
entrant in their industry-year. Significance given for a two-sample t-test of equality between joining and non-joining firms,
with * - 5%, ** - 1%, *** - 0.1%
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Table 6: OLS Regressions for Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Firm Characteristics
Full Sample Base Sample
From 1 1 16 16 21 1 1 16 16 21
To 16 21 21 36 36 16 21 21 36 36
Panel A: Listing
DJSI+ 0.449 0.762 0.384 0.904 0.373 0.357 0.520 0.250 0.926 0.579
(0.606) (0.694) (0.369) (0.730) (0.640) (0.460) (0.531) (0.273) (0.558) (0.497)
Size 2.072∗∗ 2.110∗ −0.107 1.111 0.711 −8.258 −10.822 −1.328 −9.784 −8.702
(0.720) (0.825) (0.439) (0.869) (0.762) (5.565) (6.420) (3.302) (6.747) (6.009)
Size2 −0.242∗∗ −0.269∗∗ −0.009 −0.178 −0.110 0.741 0.988 0.117 0.786 0.692
(0.091) (0.104) (0.055) (0.109) (0.096) (0.533) (0.615) (0.316) (0.646) (0.575)
Size3 0.009∗ 0.011∗ 0.001 0.008 0.005 −0.021 −0.028 −0.002 −0.018 −0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018)
Profitability −0.799∗∗∗ −1.538∗∗∗ −0.460∗∗∗ 0.547∗ 1.039∗∗∗ −1.540∗ −2.355∗∗ −0.508 1.181 1.470∗
(0.221) (0.253) (0.135) (0.267) (0.234) (0.641) (0.739) (0.380) (0.777) (0.692)
Profitability2 −0.025 −0.056 −0.018 0.001 −0.011 0.223 1.374 1.046∗∗ 1.624∗ 0.642
(0.031) (0.035) (0.019) (0.037) (0.032) (0.642) (0.741) (0.381) (0.778) (0.693)
Profitability3 0.003 0.005 −0.002 −0.006 −0.008∗ −0.010 −0.201 −0.182∗ −0.362∗ −0.183
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.127) (0.147) (0.075) (0.154) (0.137)
Leverage −3.095 −3.405 −0.475 4.493 4.041∗ 5.439 6.659 2.011 2.487 −0.548
(1.926) (2.206) (1.173) (2.323) (2.036) (4.448) (5.132) (2.639) (5.393) (4.803)
Leverage2 −1.317 0.242 1.790 −16.203∗∗ −14.976∗∗ −22.080∗ −25.538∗ −5.290 −10.315 −3.274
(5.105) (5.847) (3.110) (6.157) (5.397) (10.471) (12.081) (6.213) (12.696) (11.307)
Leverage3 4.930 3.692 −1.432 13.478∗∗ 12.460∗∗ 19.549∗∗ 20.665∗ 2.239 5.560 2.137
(3.679) (4.215) (2.241) (4.437) (3.890) (7.137) (8.234) (4.235) (8.654) (7.707)
R2 0.044 0.036 0.030 0.032 0.041 0.034 0.039 0.051 0.089 0.083
Adj. R2 0.042 0.034 0.028 0.030 0.039 0.022 0.028 0.040 0.078 0.072
Panel B: De-listing
DJSI− 7.260 5.709 2.762 0.496 -0.889 2.643 1.031 -2.947 -0.122 1.544
(5.240) (4.661) (8.982) (5.270) (6.223) (3.788) (3.324) (6.170) (3.856) (4.588)
Size 5.249 3.616 -4.01 -1.932 -5.835 64.293 66.418 88.743 -11.106 -61.942
(5.360) -4.768 -9.188 -5.391 -6.365 -51.066 -44.811 -83.171 -51.976 -61.843
Size2 0.691 -0.622 -0.012 0.064 0.635 -5.890 -6.048 -7.787 1.137 5.688
-0.667 -0.594 -1.144 -0.671 -0.792 -4.747 -4.166 -7.732 -4.832 -5.749
Size3 0.026 0.027 0.013 0.003 -0.02 0.179 0.182 0.225 -0.038 -0.172
-0.027 -0.024 -0.046 -0.027 -0.032 -0.145 -0.128 -0.237 -0.148 -0.176
Profitability -15.058*** -12.941*** -3.496 2.683** 6.177*** -15.607*** -8.209** 19.354*** 21.407*** 25.412***
-1.33 -1.183 -2.28 -1.338 -1.58 -4.378 -3.842 -7.13 -4.456 -5.302
Profitability2 0.126 0.097 -0.28 -0.03 0.062 5.223 0.241 -15.126* -20.942*** -27.556***
-0.362 -0.322 -0.62 -0.364 -0.43 -5.09 -4.467 -8.29 -5.181 -6.164
Profitability3 0.033* 0.03* -0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.542 0.235 2.400 3.354*** 4.521***
-0.018 -0.016 -0.03 -0.018 -0.021 -1.004 -0.881 -1.635 -1.021 -1.215
Leverage -33.445** -18.957 25.893 29.215** 35.903** -5.904 6.141 23.646 -12.642 -24.608
-13.951 -12.409 -23.913 -14.031 -16.567 -35.025 -30.735 -57.045 -35.649 -42.417
Leverage2 27.776 9.312 -53.756 -83.903** -98.819** -17.421 -40.571 -95.016 -13.013 18.037
-36.709 -32.65 -62.92 -36.919 -43.593 -79.411 -69.685 -129.338 -80.826 -96.171
Leverage3 7.497 12.28 31.797 62.713** 72.447** 24.627 37.366 76.436 20.12 -2.318
-26.407 -23.487 -45.262 -26.558 -31.359 -53.008 -46.516 -86.335 -53.953 -64.196
R2 0.010 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.008 0.015 0.013 0.036 0.012 0.015
Adj − R2 0.010 0.007 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.029 0.010 0.013
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Notes: Coefficients are reported for the base sample (All), and for the reduced sample with just firms with a size at least 80%
of the size of the smallest firm gaining listing (Large). Selected pairings of from and to dates are shown. Coefficients from
regression CARi[from, to] = α+ βDJSIDJSIiy + θXiy + γj + ψy + iy for cumulative abnormal returns between the from
and to dates stated at the top of the column, CARi[from, to]. DJSIy is a dummy taking the value 1 if firm i joins the DJSI
in year y. Xiy is a vector of common firm characteristics associated with stock returns, being size (log assets), return on
equity and leverage (ratio of debt to capital). All characteristics are included as linear, quadratic and cubic. γj is an industry
fixed effect where firm i is in industry j as defined by the North American Industry Classification System at the two-digit
level. ψy are year fixed effects. Figures in parentheses report robust standard errors. Significance denoted by * = 1%, ** =
5%, and ***=1%. N=22159
and cubic. Robustness checks have been performed using just the linear, and then the linear with quadratic
effects.
Panel A shows that across all five periods, and for both samples, the main consistency observed is that
the DJSI joining dummy is not significant in any of the ten equations. Such a result is opposite to the
univariate tests of the previous section, but is entirely in line with the ambiguity of conclusions on listing
effects in the current literature. Firm size is used to split the sample and for the full sample log assets
has significant coefficients on the linear, quadratic and cubic terms. Only for the full 31 day period is no
significance really seen. By contrast in the base sample very few of these size coefficients are significant.
Profitability is significant in the linear term, but not for the quadratic or cubic. Leverage in these equations
is also significant in the full sample, this can be linked to the correlations observed in Table 2. When reducing
to the base sample much of the significance of leverage disappears.
Panel B of Table 6 indicates no significance to any of the de-listing dummies, this is consistent with the
message on listing also. However, in the listing case there were significant effects arising from firm size; such
are not found in the de-listing results. Consequently these tables offer little motivation for the movement to a
base sample. Profitability coefficients become larger in magnitude in the base sample, whilst the significance
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of some leverage coefficients from the full sample disappear when only the larger firms have focus. Table 7
looks at an extended set of time ranges and reports only the coefficient on the DJSIX dummy. Occasional
evidence of significance is seen. As in the listing analysis there is limited evidence of a DJSIX effect once
firm characteristics are controlled for. Because the generalised synthetic control results look only at the full
sample to maximise the possible candidates for the matched portfolio this lack of motivation for a reduced
sample serves to aid the case for the Xu (2017) approach adopted in this paper.
Table 7: Estimated Listing Effect from Cumulative Abnormal Returns OLS Regressions
From 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6
To 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF 22 26 11 15
DJSI+ Full 0.378 0.449 0.379 0.484 0.834 0.909 0.762 0.642 0.850 0.377 0.357
(0.591) (0.606) (0.620) (0.631) (0.653) (0.691) (0.694) (0.720) (0.825) (0.350) (0.480)
Base 0.270 0.357 0.383 0.517 0.663 0.618 0.520 0.398 0.729 0.334 0.286
(0.452) (0.460) (0.471) (0.481) (0.499) (0.527) (0.531) (0.549) (0.636) (0.260) (0.366)
DJSI− Full 6.888 7.260 6.328 6.425 6.516 6.398 5.709 5.704 3.978 15.80** 12.09***
(5.430) (5.244) (5.061) (4.932) (4.799) (4.783) (4.661) (4.554) (4.244) (8.006) (6.029)
Base 2.622 2.643 2.221 1.867 1.390 0.603 1.031 1.323 0.126 12.21** 7.253
(3.927) (3.788) (3.572) (3.575) (3.488) (3.403) (3.324) (3.247) (3.033) (5.997) (4.838)
From 6 6 6 6 6 11 11 11 11 11 11
To ANN 17 20 EFF 26 11 15 ANN 17 EFF 26
DJSI+ Full 0.428 0.359 0.888 0.741 0.829 0.108 0.088 0.159 0.090 0.472 0.560
(0.496) (0.513) (0.591) (0.596) (0.728) (0.145) (0.351) (0.371) (0.389) (0.496) (0.632)
Base 0.373 0.399 0.633 0.536 0.745 0.089 0.041 0.129 0.155 0.291 0.501
(0.375) (0.385) (0.436) (0.444) (0.546) (0.114) (0.284) (0.294) (0.305) (0.381) (0.489)
DJSI− Full 12.16* 11.14* 9.703* 8.592 5.762 17.82 8.786 9.462 8.098 5.500 2.752
(6.528) (6.198) (5.611) (5.487) (4.834) (19.34) (10.64) (9.468) (8.578) (6.911) (5.716)
Base 6.863 5.913 3.018 3.428 1.737 14.90 2.832 2.853 1.798 -0.320 -1.369
(4.586) (4.380) (3.918) (3.829) (3.400) (14.08) (7.059) (6.355) (5.850) (4.678) (3.949)
From 15 15 15 15 15 ANN ANN ANN ANN ANN ANN
To 15 ANN 17 20 EFF 26 ANN 17 18 19 20
DJSI+ Full 0.087 0.158 0.088 0.618 0.471 0.559 0.071 0.002 0.107 0.457 0.531
(0.155) (0.206) (0.244) (0.379) (0.395) (0.544) (0.140) (0.196) (0.246) (0.292) (0.349)
Base 0.113 0.201 0.227 0.461* 0.363 0.573 0.088 0.114 0.248 0.393* 0.348
(0.119) (0.151) (0.178) (0.275) (0.290) (0.417) (0.100) (0.142) (0.182) (0.213) (0.256)
DJSI− Full -12.97 -0.061 -0.069 1.946 0.515 -1.073 12.84 6.379 5.101 5.119 4.928
(21.21) (14.62) (11.68) (5.947) (3.728) (3.706) (19.16) (13.54) (15.52) (10.11) (9.570)
Base -8.415 -2.727 -3.329 -5.947 -3.728 -3.706 2.961 -0.786 -1.989 -3.231 5.454
(14.30) (10.22) (8.547) (6.230) (5.781) (4.553) (13.27) (10.04) (8.482) (7.466) (5.718)
From ANN ANN ANN 17 17 18 19 20 20 EFF EFF
To EFF 22 26 17 EFF EFF EFF EFF 22 EFF 22
DJSI+ Full 0.384 0.264 0.472 -0.069 0.313 0.382 0.277 -0.073 -0.192 -0.147 -0.267
(0.369) (0.399) (0.530) (0.133) (0.334) (0.307) (0.265) (0.218) (0.261) (0.162) (0.218)
Base 0.250 0.129 0.460 0.026 0.162 0.136 0.002 -0.143 -0.265 -0.098 -0.219
(0.273) (0.300) (0.409) (0.098) (0.248) (0.223) (0.193) (0.154) (0.190) (0.122) (0.166)
DJSI− Full 2.762 3.166 0.909 -0.085 0.745 0.953 1.416 -1.954 -8.073 6.564 -1.242
(8.982) (8.276) (6.736) (18.44) (10.03) (11.60) (13.65) (17.53) (13.70) (23.44) (15.91)
Base -2.947 -1.460 -3.278 -4.532 -4.128 -4.027 -3.985 -2.376 0.900 9.588 8.522
(6.170) (5.765) (4.735) (13.84) (6.847) (7.696) (8.820) (10.75) (8.089) (14.53) (10.40)
From EFF EFF EFF 22 22 22 26 26 31 31 36
To 26 31 36 22 26 36 26 36 31 36 36
DJSI+ Full -0.059 -0.158 0.373 -0.120 0.088 0.520 -0.060 0.372 -0.144 0.387 -0.010
(0.393) (0.516) (0.640) (0.151) (0.363) (0.615) (0.159) (0.517) (0.168) (0.388) (0.153)
Base 0.112 0.135 0.579 -0.121 0.210 0.676 -0.067 0.400 0.004 0.447 0.048
(0.300) (0.402) (0.497) (0.110) (0.282) (0.476) (0.129) (0.408) (0.148) (0.317) (0.128)
DJSI− Full -4.091 -3.263 -0.880 5.590 -3.295 -0.410 5.766 1.463 -25.81 -0.705 -20.40
(9.329) (7.684) (6.223) (20.71) (10.08) (6.434) (21.57) (7.729) (22.41) (9.605) (21.39)
Base -1.464 0.297 1.544 7.457 -3.685 1.008 -5.408 2.553 -8.292 2.191 -14.74
(6.568) (5.491) (4.588) (13.59) (7.240) (4.783) (16.05) (5.816) (16.16) (7.492) (16.64)
Notes: Coefficients on gaining DJSI listing are reported for the base sample (Full), and for the reduced sample with just firms
with a size at least 80% of the size of the smallest firm gaining listing (Base). Coefficients for listing are from regression
CARi[from, to] = α+ βDJSIDJSI
+
iy + θXiy + γj + ψy + iy and are estimated for cumulative abnormal returns between the
stated from and to dates, CARi[from, to]. DJSI
+
iy is a dummy taking the value 1 if firm i joins the DJSI in year y. Xiy is a
vector of common firm characteristics associated with stock returns, being size (log assets), return on equity and leverage
(ratio of debt to capital). All characteristics are included as linear, quadratic and cubic. γj is an industry fixed effect where
firm i is in industry j as defined by the North American Industry Classification System at the two-digit level. ψy are year
fixed effects. For de-listing regressions are repeated but with the de-listing dummy, DJSI−i y replacing DJSI
+
i y. Figures in
parentheses report robust standard errors. Significance denoted by * = 1%, ** = 5%, and ***=1%.
Table 7 reports a wider set of ranges for the CAR, providing coefficients on the DJSI joining dummy.
These models maintain the full set of controls and fixed effects from Table 6, but the full details are not
reported for brevity. There are now some significant coefficients at the 10% level, but these account for less
than 5% of all the coefficients reported. As such this extended set does little to reverse the conclusions of a
lack of DJSI joining abnormal return that was seen in Table 6.
Regressions presented here suggest that much of the difference assigned to a new DJSI listing by the
two-sample tests may actually be a consequence of other characteristics. Attributing effects to the correct
characteristic represents one of the many challenges of using a testing approach.
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4 Generalised Synthetic Control Approach
Synthetic control methodologies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010) seek to construct a
counterfactual for a treated unit under the assumption that the treatment was not administered. Inherently
unobservable the counterfactual is used purely for identifying the treatment effect, being the difference
between the observed unit and the observed unit’s counterfactual. In the assessment of excess stock returns
from DJSI listing, the unit is the firm that gains listing and the treatment is the listing. This paper departs
from the Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) family of models by introducing the generalised approach of Xu
(2017). Departure here owes to the fact that in many instances there are multiple firms gaining listing within
the same industry and there is a strong likelihood of co-integrating relationships amongst stocks. Before
presenting the results an outline of the Xu (2017) approach is provided.
4.1 Methodology
Following Acemoglu et al. (2016) we construct a portfolio from the other stocks within the firms industry,
selected using the two digit NAICS code. As discussed the portfolio is assembled using observations from the
first trading date in November of the previous year, to 16 trading days ahead of the formal listing announce-
ment. This typically provides a training set of 230 days12. The synthetic control is then analysed for the
period between three weeks in advance of the listing announcement and three weeks after the announcement.
In total this gives a 31 trading day long period. This period reconciles with the observations of past event
studies that impacts die out soon after listing but allows for the discovery of new effects in the post-listing
that mirror identified time spans from pre-listing.
In any given industry firms are split into a treatment group, T , and a control group, C. Treated firms
are those who gain listing to the DJSI and the controls are all other firms in the same NAICS 2-digit code.
Of the N firms with sufficient data in a year, Ntr are treated and the remaining Nco are controls, such that
Nco +Ntr = N . Each firm, i, is observed for T periods, covering the T0,i control periods prior to listing, and
the qi = T − T0,i evaluation periods following the listing. Ytr. The Xu (2017) approach offers the possibility
of differing numbers of observations for each firm. However for simplicity this exposition has T0,i = T0 and
qi = q. It is thus assumed that the outcome of interest, excess returns for firm i at time t, Rit, are given by
a linear factor model, equation (6).
Rit = δitDit + x
′
itβ + λ
′
ift + it (6)
The treatment dummy, Dit, takes the value 1 for firms obtaining listing on the DJSI, that is i ∈ T and
t > T0. For our purposes there are no controls and so we can simplify the exposition to remove x
′
itβ.
Innovation in Xu (2017) draws on the λ′ift factor model which expands to (7):
λ′ift = λi1f1t + λi2f2t + ...+ λirfrt (7)
This takes a linear additive form that covers conventional additive unit and time fixed effects as special cases.
Many further common financial models are also permissable, including autoregressive components13.
Define Rit(1) as the excess stock return for firm i at time t > T0 and Rit(0) as the pre-treatment excess
returns for firm i at time t ≤ T0. δit = Rit(1)−Rit(0) for any i ∈ T , t > T0. It may be written that:
Ri = Di  δi + Fλi + i, i ∈ 1, 2, ..., Nco, Nco + 1, N (8)
in which Ri = |Ri1, Ri2, ..., RiT |;Di = |Di1, Di2, ..., DiT |′, δi = |δi1, δi2, ..., δiT |, and i = |i1, i2, ..., iT |′
are T × 1 vectors. The factors F = |f1, f2, ..., fT |′ is a (T × r) matrix. Determination of r is discussed
subsequently.
Stacking all Nco control units together produces Rco = [R1, R2, ..., RNco ] and co = [1, 2, ..., Nco], the
factor matrix, Λco = [λ1, λ2, ..., λNco ], is (Nco×r), whilst Rco and co are both (T ×Nco). The stacked model
is stated as equation (9):
Rco = FΛ
′
co + co (9)
12Because of the annual cycle of the DJSI listings we do not include a full year of training data.
13See discussion in Xu (2017) and Gobillon and Magnac (2016).
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Identification of the parameters is constrained by a requirement that F ′F/T = Ir and Λ′coΛco =diagonal.
Average listing effects for those who are listed on the DJSI, are then the average effects of treatment on the
treated (ATT ). At time t, t > T0 the ATT, ATTt,t>T0 is estimated as per equation (10)
14.
ATTt,t>T0 = 1/Ntr
∑
i∈τ
[Yit(1)− Yit(0)] = 1
Ntr
∑
i∈τ
δit (10)
Xu (2017), like Abadie et al. (2010), treat the treatment effects δit as conditional on the sample data.
Identification of these necessitates an appropriate measure of Rit(0) when t > T0 and i ∈ T 15. Estimation
of the parameters of the model proceeds using three steps. Firstly estimates for Fˆ λˆco are obtained through:
(Fˆ , Λˆco) = argmin
β˜,F˜ Λ˜co
∑
i∈C
(Ri − F˜ Λ˜i)′(Ri − F˜ Λ˜i) (11)
Recalling that this minimisation is performed subject to the twin constraints that F˜ ′F˜ /T = Ir and that
Λ˜′coΛ˜co is a diagonal matrix.
Following Xu (2017) the factor loadings are calculated. Values restricted to the pre-announcement period
gain subscript “0”’s. Hats denote estimates from (11). Step 2 is thus:
λˆi = argmin
λˆi
(R0i − Fˆ 0λ˜i)′(R0i − Fˆ 0λ˜i) (12)
= (Fˆ 0′Fˆ 0)
−1
Fˆ 0′R0i , i ∈ T
Step 3 calculates treated counterfactuals based on the estimated Fˆ and λˆco:
Rˆit(0) = λˆi
′
fˆt, i ∈ T , t > T0 (13)
Estimates for the average treatment effect on the treated, ATTt are provided as:
ˆATT t = (1/Ntr)
∑
i∈T
[Rit(1)− Rˆit(0)] for t > T0 (14)
In order to obtain convergence in the estimated factor loadings it is required that there be sufficiently large
numbers of controls and a sufficiently long control period. As we have more than 200 days of data, and a
large number of firms in each two digit NAICS code, there would not be expected to be any concerns about
convergence. Indeed in every case the reported tests of convergence reveal that the model does converge.
Within the Xu (2017) the number of factors to be included is determined using a five step procedure.
Firstly a given r is selected and an interactive fixed effects (IFE) model is estimated for the control group data
to obtain an estimate of F , Fˆ . A cross-validation loop is run at step 2 which first works systematically through
the control period omitting one period and obtaining factor loadings for each treated unit, i, according to
the formula:
λˆi,−s == (F 0′−sF
0
−s)
−1
F 0′−sR
0
i−s, i ∈ T (15)
where the use of −s in the subscripts denotes the ommision of period s from the estimation. Predicted
outcomes for the missing period are saved and compared with the observed period s return to construct a
prediction error eis = Ris(0)−Rˆis(0). Step 3 sees the calculation of the mean square predicted error (MSPE)
given the selected number of factors. Given r the MSPE is:
MSPE(r) =
T0∑
s=1
∑
i∈T
e2is/T0 (16)
14For more on the social economic interpretation of this see Blackwell and Glynn (2018).
15A discussion of the requirements for causal inference in the generalised synthetic control framework is provided as a
supplementary appendix to Xu (2017).
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Repeating the process over further possible r enables the identification of r∗ as that number of factors which
minimises the MSPE from equation (16). Xu (2017) demonstrate through Monte Carlo simulation that this
simplistic procedure performs well in factor number selection16.
In order to obtain inference from the estimated ATT we need a conditional variance of the ATT estimator,
i.e. V ar( ˆATT t|Dt,ΛF ). Although  should be the only random variable not being conditioned upon, it
may be correlated with λˆi from the estimation loop above. Nonetheless,  remains a measurement of the
variations in returns that we cannot explain and which is unrelated to treatment assignment.
In an approach similar to Acemoglu et al. (2016), Xu (2017) proposes a four step algorithm for determining
the uncertainty estimates of, and hence confidence intervals for, ˆATT t. Treated counterfactuals are simulated
for control units, that is firms whose DJSI membership status does not change in the given year. For this
purpose the resampling scheme is given as:
R˜i(0) = Fˆ λˆi + ˜i, ∀i ∈ C;
R˜i(0) = Fˆ λˆi + ˜
p
i , ∀i ∈ T ;
where simulated outcomes from the event of the treatment not occurring are collected in R˜i(0), the estimated
conditional mean is captured through the estimated factors, Fˆ λˆi and the resampled residuals are incorporated
through ˜i and ˜
p
i . The variance of the latter is liable to be bigger than the former since Fˆ λˆi is estimated
from the control units and will therefore be expected to fit better on those firms that did not gain listing.
Step one is to start a loop that will run a specified number of times to generate a sufficiently large number
of comparison observations for the confidence intervals. Within this element of the process it is necessary
take a control unit, i, and act as if it has been treated in the time t > T0. The rest of the control units
are resampled with replacement to form a new sample which contains that new “treated” unit and a full
set of Nco controls. The generalized synthetic control method is applied to obtain a vector of residuals,
ˆp(m) = Ri − Rˆi(0). Collecting these residuals from every loop then creates a vector ep. Step two applies
the generalised synthetic control method to the original data to obtain the fitted average treatment effects,
ˆATT t for all time periods. Estimate coefficients and obtain fitted values and residuals for the control units,
Rˆco = {Rˆ1(0), Rˆ2(0), ....RˆNco(0)} and eˆ = {ˆ1, ˆ2, ˆNco}
Step three of the process then involves another bootstrap loop, operating for B2 repetitions. For each
repetition a bootstrapped sample, S(k) is used. In this case in round k ∈ {1, ..., B2 the previous estimates of
˜i and ˜
p
j are randomly selected from the sets and e
p. We fit Rˆi = Fˆ λˆi and hence construct a sample by:
R˜i
(k)
(0) = Rˆi(0) + ˜iı ∈ C
R˜i
(k)
(0) = Rˆj(0) + ˜
p
i  ∈ T
In this case Xu (2017) notes that the simulated treatment counterfactuals do not contain the treatment effect.
From here the generalised synthetic control is applied to the bootstrapped sampled S(k) new estimates for the
average treatment effects, ˆATT t,t>T0 . Adding this estimate to the others creates a set of stored estimates
allowing the final obtaining of the bootstrap estimator ˆATT
k
t,t>T0 . Finally the variance of all of these
collected average treatment effects may be calculated and the confidence intervals constructed accordingly.
Advantageously this is implemented automatically within Xu and Liu (2018).
Contrast with the simpler approaches used in Section 3 comes from the calculation of the synthetic
portfolio data, compared to the CAPM abnormal return estimates embeds a role for non-listed firms. In so
doing the generalised synthetic control approach addresses one of the concerns raised by Hawn et al. (2018).
Earlier t-test comparisons and dummy variables for listings both saw influences from other firms on the
magnitude of the listing effect. As reported, the introduction of a further dependence on the relationship
between the control and treatment groups embeds robustness to any shock which equally effects all in the
industry. Further, by isolating those movements that would have happened under the assumption of an
ongoing relationship with non-listed stocks, deviations can much more readily be attributed to the listing.
16It is also shown to perform well in small datasets, but this is not a concern for our daily financial data (Xu, 2017).
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4.2 Results
Cumulative abnormal returns are available for periods of one day, or longer, within the 36 day treatment
period. A total of 630 combinations of start and end time are possible. Brevity dictates that only a
selection of these may be reported, full results being provided in a supplementary appendix. Building on the
precedent in Acemoglu et al. (2016, 2017) and Chamon et al. (2017), we employ the generalised framework
of Xu (2017) to estimate said. This leap from the original Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al.
(2010) approach is taken because there are too often more than one company obtaining listing on the DJSI
from any given industry. The original synthetic control cannot deal efficiently with such. Table ?? already
highlighted the presence of multiple treatments within the industry-year. These figures are repeated within
the fit comparisons of Table 8.
Table 8 primary purpose is to report the fit statistics for the generalised synthetic control and to offer
comparison with the CAPM generated fits. These are reported for the in-sample control period. MSPE
values are reported at the two digit NAICS code level to indicate the quality of the fit through the training
period. In the majority of cases these values are below 2, with high values appearing only where the number
of controls is low. There are many occasions near the GFC where the synthetic control model has an MSPE
well below that associated with the CAPM, sometimes being less than half that of the original approach.
Industry 21 in 2005 is a good example of this. In more recent years the number of times where the CAPM
delivers a better fit is almost identical, though often the margin is very small. There remain times where
the synthetic control error is less than half that of the CAPM model, including industry 33 in 2018 where
the MSPE is just 1.424 compared to an MSPE of 4.102 for the CAPM. Overall there are 55 cases where
the CAPM can be considered better fitting during the control period, compared to 82 for the generalised
synthetic control approach. A t-test to compare the MSPE for the two models weighting all industry-years
equally confirms a better fit from the generalised synthetic approach significant at the 5% level.
Model fit from the generalised synthetic control is again better than that from the corresponding CAPM,
with the in sample MSPE comparison showing it to be the better fit in 31 cases compared to 24 for the
CAPM. Table 9 provides the full comparison. This is a smaller differential than for the entering firms.
As with entry where the generalised synthetic control does improve fit the margin of improvement is much
larger, industry 51 in 2006 has two firms leaving the market and a MSPE of 4.355 from the CAPM but just
1.346 for the generalised synthetic control. Another parallel is seen in the more even performance of the two
techniques in recent years. From Table 9 the number of cointegrating relationships in each model can be
seen.
Of particular interest to the study of net listing effects are the abnormal returns of periods that involve
the announcement date. However to fully evidence any pre-announcement and correction effects we also
consider the week immediately before the announcement and the week following the effective date. Start
dates are provided from the first day of the treatment period up to, and including the day after the effective
date. A full set of abnormal returns over periods of one day, or longer, is included within the appendix.
Ahead of the announcement there would be little public information as to which shares are to gain listing.
However, the first columns of Table 10 reveal a number of positive significant CARs. This applies to periods
beginning two weeks prior to the announcement and is most striking for those which end on day 12. Investors
who react to these gains by then purchasing the joining stocks would see a significant negative CAR for the
period between day 13 and the announcement date. In terms of the extant literature the positive returns
are in line with the pre-announcement effect.
Evidence is provided that much of the uptick from DJSI listing occurs prior to the change date, a re-
sult which appears in Oberndorfer et al. (2013). There is also evidence in the synthetic control cumulative
abnormal returns of the correction that Oberndorfer et al. (2013) argues takes place after the announce-
ment date. Such reversion effects manifest as negative abnormal returns in the windows starting after the
announcement date and ending in the trading days immediately after the effective date. Three weeks post
effective date none of the reduced set of periods show significant cumulative abnormal returns. Herein we
see the correction effect mentioned in the literature. But, as can be seen in Table 11 this is not as strong as
it was implied to be by the CAPM in Table 5. For all time frames starting before the announcement date
there are positive cumulative abnormal returns but their magnitude diminishes and their significance is lost
post announcement.
Using the same reduced set of from and to dates we may appraise the magnitude of the abnormal returns
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Table 8: Fit Statistics by Industry
Year NAICS2 V. Co. Tr Ctrl MSPE Year NAICS2 V. Co. Tr Ctrl MSPE
CAPM Synth CAPM Synth
2005 21 0 3 1 129 3.344 1.358 2011 53 0 5 1 178 1.919 1.142
2005 22 0 5 6 99 1.488 0.631 2011 56 0 1 1 49 1.882 1.666
2005 23 0 3 1 31 2.703 2.639 2011 72 0 1 1 47 0.914 0.983
2005 31 0 1 3 105 0.783 0.839 2012 22 0 5 1 98 0.895 0.568
2005 32 0 5 8 318 1.041 1.003 2012 31 0 4 2 107 0.606 0.600
2005 33 0 2 9 661 1.602 1.54 2012 32 0 1 2 275 0.517 0.619
2005 44 0 1 4 89 1.628 1.607 2012 33 0 2 2 574 1.416 1.403
2005 45 0 2 1 53 1.149 1.032 2012 45 0 1 1 36 7.648 7.772
2005 48 0 5 1 89 0.915 0.825 2012 51 0 2 3 263 2.309 2.181
2005 51 0 1 4 285 0.866 0.96 2012 52 0 3 1 499 2.421 1.967
2005 52 0 2 7 535 0.707 0.716 2012 54 0 1 1 107 1.864 1.964
2005 54 0 4 2 112 1.744 1.751 2012 56 0 1 1 48 0.738 0.789
2005 56 0 3 1 57 0.862 0.897 2013 21 0 3 2 152 1.594 1.396
2005 72 0 5 1 62 1.18 1.093 2013 31 0 3 2 112 0.574 0.86
2006 21 0 5 2 140 4.53 1.608 2013 32 0 2 4 293 1.329 1.377
2006 22 0 5 4 104 0.786 0.936 2013 33 0 1 4 587 0.728 1.265
2006 31 0 4 1 109 0.402 0.416 2013 44 0 5 2 83 0.852 0.883
2006 32 0 3 3 327 2.244 1.721 2013 51 0 1 2 287 3.11 3.061
2006 33 0 1 1 683 1.767 1.826 2013 52 0 3 2 542 1.229 1.057
2006 42 0 5 1 82 0.852 0.896 2013 53 0 5 3 191 1.443 1.122
2006 51 0 1 1 301 4.355 4.331 2013 54 0 1 1 103 4.532 4.533
2006 52 0 3 3 540 0.872 0.841 2014 22 0 5 2 100 0.714 0.749
2007 21 0 3 1 162 1.623 0.936 2014 23 0 4 2 46 0.683 0.734
2007 22 0 1 1 106 1.143 1.111 2014 32 0 4 1 349 1.991 2.172
2007 33 0 4 2 694 3.035 2.754 2014 33 0 3 3 637 1.353 1.416
2007 45 0 4 1 49 2.592 2.509 2014 48 0 3 1 119 0.678 0.663
2007 51 0 4 1 318 2.442 2.465 2014 51 0 4 2 322 2.277 2.221
2007 52 0 4 3 517 1.047 1.042 2014 52 0 4 2 591 0.836 0.820
2007 54 0 1 1 114 1.681 1.719 2014 53 0 3 1 220 1.341 1.343
2007 62 0 3 1 52 3.394 3.211 2014 72 0 1 1 58 0.938 0.968
2008 31 0 5 1 104 1.820 1.835 2015 23 0 4 1 43 2.23 0.866
2008 32 0 4 1 282 3.700 3.610 2015 31 0 5 2 105 0.473 1.056
2008 33 0 4 2 573 5.592 3.728 2015 32 0 2 3 392 0.813 0.851
2008 45 0 2 1 34 5.020 2.519 2015 33 0 5 1 599 0.839 0.912
2008 51 0 1 1 256 4.680 4.631 2015 51 0 4 1 333 0.728 0.739
2008 52 0 3 2 440 4.913 3.562 2015 52 0 5 1 592 0.426 0.414
2008 53 0 2 2 156 3.518 2.810 2015 53 0 5 2 217 1.459 0.961
2008 56 0 2 1 51 1.604 1.598 2015 72 0 5 1 61 3.01 0.982
2009 21 0 1 1 119 10.00 5.781 2016 31 0 4 2 105 1.034 1.040
2009 31 0 5 1 88 2.317 2.103 2016 32 0 1 1 381 1.122 1.353
2009 32 0 3 4 221 4.63 4.636 2016 33 0 3 2 560 0.729 2.150
2009 33 0 5 2 430 3.386 3.409 2016 44 0 2 1 81 1.577 1.225
2009 42 0 1 2 60 4.482 4.687 2016 51 0 5 1 329 2.387 2.423
2009 44 0 4 1 60 4.626 4.573 2016 52 0 5 3 564 2.06 1.431
2009 45 0 5 1 26 9.064 5.498 2016 53 0 5 2 223 3.039 2.452
2009 48 0 4 1 84 3.057 2.609 2016 56 0 3 1 53 0.585 0.621
2009 51 0 5 1 204 2.138 2.161 2017 21 0 5 2 121 3.634 3.520
2009 52 0 5 3 353 9.198 7.351 2017 31 0 3 2 106 1.029 0.783
2009 54 0 1 1 87 4.522 4.543 2017 32 0 3 2 388 1.922 1.992
2010 21 0 2 3 141 4.235 1.947 2017 33 0 5 3 576 1.834 1.904
2010 32 0 1 4 274 1.314 1.333 2017 48 0 5 1 115 1.803 1.452
2010 33 0 5 3 572 1.365 1.262 2017 51 0 3 2 330 0.793 0.828
2010 51 0 5 1 248 0.593 0.664 2017 52 0 5 2 608 0.801 0.955
2010 54 0 5 2 111 2.241 2.227 2017 53 0 5 2 224 1.639 1.088
2010 56 0 1 1 46 2.192 2.343 2017 54 0 1 1 88 1.566 1.689
2011 32 0 4 1 273 0.954 1.003 2017 72 0 2 2 62 0.713 0.728
2011 33 0 3 4 577 1.463 1.477 2018 21 0 4 1 103 1.839 0.827
2011 44 0 1 1 80 3.391 3.39 2018 32 0 5 2 221 1.748 1.787
2011 45 0 5 1 33 1.628 1.382 2018 33 0 5 2 401 4.102 3.693
2011 48 0 4 2 88 3.359 2.664 2018 52 0 2 2 429 1.097 1.13
2011 52 0 4 3 462 1.284 0.969 2018 56 0 4 1 28 0.698 0.745
Notes: Models are fitted using the generalised synthetic control method of Xu (2017). NAICS2 reports the two-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for the considered industry. MSPE is the Mean Squared Prediction
Error when fitting the synthetic versions of the fitted shares to the training data. CAPM reports the MSPE for the CAPM
based CARs from Section 2.3, whilst Synth reports the MSPE for the generalised synthetic control methodology. V. reports a
test for the cointegration of the error matrix with 0 implying rejection. Co. gives the number of cointegrating relationships
used in the construction of the unobserved parameter. Tr is the number of firms who joined the DJSI for that two digit NAICS
code. Ctrl is the number of control firms used to construct the couterfactual model for entering firms. All firms with missing
data are eliminated, including some new listings to the DJSI. All estimations performed using gsynth (Xu and Liu, 2018)
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Table 9: Fit Statistics by Industry
Year NAICS2 V. Co. Tr Ctrl MSPE Year NAICS2 V. Co. Tr Ctrl MSPE
CAPM Synth CAPM Synth
2006 22 0 2 2 106 0.786 0.895 2013 33 0 4 3 588 0.728 0.895
2006 31 0 4 1 109 0.402 0.846 2013 44 0 4 1 84 0.852 1.923
2006 33 0 1 2 682 1.767 1.521 2013 52 0 3 3 541 1.229 3.065
2006 51 0 5 2 300 4.355 1.346 2014 32 0 5 1 349 1.991 0.679
2006 52 0 4 2 541 0.872 1.044 2014 51 0 2 1 323 2.277 0.719
2007 51 0 5 1 318 2.442 2.307 2014 72 0 1 1 58 0.938 0.417
2007 52 0 4 2 518 1.047 0.911 2015 23 0 3 1 43 2.23 1.137
2008 32 0 4 1 282 3.7 2.917 2015 31 0 4 1 106 0.473 0.398
2008 33 0 4 1 574 5.592 2.841 2015 33 0 5 4 596 0.839 0.987
2008 51 0 2 1 256 4.68 3.508 2015 52 0 3 1 592 0.426 0.927
2009 32 0 3 1 224 4.63 3.844 2015 53 0 2 1 218 1.459 1.226
2009 33 0 2 1 431 3.386 6.38 2016 31 0 4 1 106 1.034 0.465
2009 52 0 4 1 355 9.198 13.484 2016 32 0 2 1 381 1.122 1.250
2010 32 0 2 4 274 1.314 1.168 2016 33 0 4 2 560 0.729 1.128
2010 33 0 3 2 573 1.365 2.31 2016 52 0 5 1 566 2.06 0.520
2010 51 0 4 1 248 0.593 1.303 2016 56 0 4 1 53 0.585 1.370
2010 56 0 5 1 46 2.192 0.647 2017 21 0 4 3 120 3.634 1.236
2011 52 0 5 1 464 1.284 0.88 2017 31 0 4 2 106 1.029 1.647
2011 56 0 1 1 49 1.882 1.065 2017 32 0 1 1 389 1.922 0.502
2012 22 0 5 2 97 0.895 0.73 2017 33 0 1 1 578 1.834 1.942
2012 32 0 1 2 275 0.517 1.154 2017 51 0 1 1 331 0.793 0.761
2012 33 0 2 4 572 1.416 2.699 2017 52 0 4 1 609 0.801 0.538
2012 45 0 1 2 35 7.648 5.01 2017 53 0 5 1 225 1.639 2.989
2012 51 0 2 2 264 2.309 0.707 2017 72 0 5 1 63 0.713 1.679
2012 52 0 4 1 499 2.421 1.02 2018 31 0 5 2 57 2.133 1.103
2012 54 0 1 2 106 1.864 2.355 2018 32 0 4 2 221 1.748 1.795
2013 31 0 2 1 113 0.574 1.039 2018 52 0 4 2 429 1.097 0.61
2013 32 0 5 5 292 1.329 1.125
Notes: Models are fitted using the generalised synthetic control method of Xu (2017). NAICS2 reports the two-digit North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for the considered industry. MSPE is the Mean Squared Prediction
Error when fitting the synthetic versions of the fitted shares to the training data. CAPM reports the MSPE for the CAPM
based CARs from Section 2.3, whilst Synth reports the MSPE for the generalised synthetic control methodology. V. reports a
test for the cointegration of the error matrix with 0 implying rejection. Co. gives the number of cointegrating relationships
used in the construction of the unobserved parameter. Tr is the number of firms who exited the DJSI for that two digit NAICS
code. Ctrl is the number of control firms used to construct the counterfactual model for de-listed firms. All firms with missing
data are eliminated, including some de-listings from the DJSI. All estimations performed using gsynth (Xu and Liu, 2018)
Table 10: Synthetic Control Cumulative Abnormal Returns t-test Summaries
From/To 11 12 13 14 15 ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF
1 0.353 0.28 0.259 0.364 0.516* 0.598* 0.491 0.4 0.328 0.356 0.572
2 0.399* 0.326 0.305 0.41 0.562* 0.644** 0.537 0.446 0.374 0.402 0.618
3 0.29 0.217 0.196 0.301 0.453 0.535* 0.428 0.337 0.265 0.293 0.509
4 0.194 0.122 0.101 0.206 0.358 0.44 0.333 0.242 0.169 0.197 0.414
5 0.167 0.094 0.074 0.178 0.33 0.412 0.305 0.214 0.142 0.17 0.387
6 0.181 0.108 0.088 0.192 0.345 0.427 0.32 0.228 0.156 0.184 0.401
7 -0.073 -0.094 0.011 0.163 0.245 0.138 0.047 -0.025 0.003 0.219
8 -0.021 0.084 0.236 0.318 0.211 0.12 0.048 0.076 0.292
9 0.105 0.257 0.339* 0.232 0.141 0.068 0.096 0.313
10 0.152 0.234 0.127 0.036 -0.036 -0.008 0.208
11 0.082 -0.025 -0.116 -0.188 -0.16 0.056
12 -0.107 -0.198 -0.27* -0.242 -0.026
13 -0.091 -0.163 -0.135 0.081
14 -0.072 -0.044 0.172
15 0.028 0.245
16 0.217
ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF 22 23 26 31 36
1 0.572 0.608 0.715* 0.89* 0.742 0.713 0.556 0.534 0.512 0.33 0.441
2 0.618 0.654 0.762* 0.936** 0.789 0.76 0.602 0.58 0.558 0.376 0.487
3 0.509 0.545 0.653 0.827* 0.68 0.65 0.493 0.471 0.449 0.267 0.378
4 0.414 0.45 0.557 0.732* 0.584 0.555 0.397 0.376 0.354 0.172 0.283
5 0.387 0.422 0.53 0.704 0.557 0.528 0.37 0.348 0.326 0.144 0.256
6 0.401 0.436 0.544 0.719 0.571 0.542 0.384 0.363 0.34 0.159 0.270
7 0.219 0.255 0.363 0.537 0.39 0.361 0.203 0.181 0.159 -0.023 0.088
8 0.292 0.328 0.436 0.61 0.463 0.434 0.276 0.254 0.232 0.05 0.161
9 0.313 0.349 0.456 0.631 0.483 0.454 0.296 0.275 0.253 0.071 0.182
10 0.208 0.244 0.352 0.526 0.379 0.35 0.192 0.17 0.148 -0.034 0.077
11 0.056 0.092 0.2 0.374 0.227 0.197 0.04 0.018 -0.004 -0.186 -0.075
12 -0.026 0.01 0.117 0.292 0.144 0.115 -0.042 -0.064 -0.086 -0.268 -0.157
13 0.081 0.117 0.224 0.399 0.251 0.222 0.064 0.043 0.021 -0.161 -0.050
14 0.172 0.208 0.316 0.49 0.343 0.313 0.156 0.134 0.112 -0.07 0.041
15 0.245 0.28 0.388 0.562* 0.415 0.386 0.228 0.206 0.184 0.002 0.114
ANN 0.217 0.252 0.36 0.534* 0.387 0.358 0.2 0.178 0.156 -0.026 0.086
17 0.036 0.143 0.318 0.17 0.141 -0.017 -0.038 -0.06 -0.242 -0.131
18 0.108 0.282 0.135 0.106 -0.052 -0.074 -0.096 -0.278 -0.167
19 0.175 0.027 -0.002 -0.16 -0.181 -0.204 -0.385 -0.274
20 -0.148 -0.177 -0.334 -0.356 -0.378 -0.56* -0.449
EFF -0.029 -0.187 -0.208 -0.231 -0.412 -0.301
22 -0.158 -0.179 -0.201 -0.383 -0.272
Notes: Average cumulative abnormal returns are reported for the period starting on the row label and ending according to the
column label. These are averaged over time and industry. A t-test across the time-industry space results in a report of their
difference from zero. Significant returns are denoted by * - 5%, ** - 1% and *** - 0.1%. A full set of results are reported in
the supplementary material.
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Table 11: Synthetic Control Cumulative Abnormal Returns t-test Summaries: De-listing
From/To 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ANN
1 -0.345 -0.157 -0.02 0.24 0.455 0.469 0.417 0.61 0.566 0.495 0.605
2 -0.194 -0.006 0.131 0.391 0.606 0.62 0.568 0.761 0.717 0.646 0.756
3 -0.107 0.081 0.218 0.478 0.693 0.707 0.654 0.848* 0.804* 0.733 0.843*
4 -0.074 0.114 0.251 0.512 0.726* 0.741* 0.688 0.882* 0.837* 0.766 0.877*
5 -0.16 0.028 0.165 0.425 0.64 0.654 0.602 0.795* 0.751 0.68 0.790
6 -0.068 0.12 0.256 0.517 0.731* 0.746* 0.693* 0.887* 0.842* 0.771 0.882*
7 0.188 0.325 0.585* 0.8* 0.814** 0.762* 0.955** 0.911** 0.84* 0.950**
8 0.137 0.397 0.612* 0.626* 0.574 0.767* 0.723* 0.652 0.762*
9 0.261 0.475 0.489 0.437 0.63 0.586 0.515 0.626
10 0.214 0.229 0.176 0.37 0.325 0.254 0.365
11 0.015 -0.038 0.155 0.111 0.04 0.151
12 -0.053 0.141 0.096 0.025 0.136
13 0.194 0.149 0.078 0.189
14 -0.044 -0.115 -0.005
15 -0.071 0.040
ANN 0.111
ANN 17 18 19 20 EFF 22 23 26 31 36
1 0.605 0.709 0.741 0.799 0.531 0.453 0.467 0.173 0.217 0.308 0.214
2 0.756 0.859* 0.892* 0.95* 0.682 0.604 0.618 0.324 0.367 0.459 0.364
3 0.843* 0.946* 0.979* 1.036** 0.769 0.691 0.704 0.411 0.454 0.545 0.451
4 0.877* 0.98* 1.012** 1.07** 0.802 0.724 0.738 0.445 0.488 0.579 0.485
5 0.790 0.893* 0.926* 0.984* 0.716 0.638 0.652 0.358 0.401 0.493 0.398
6 0.882* 0.985** 1.017** 1.075** 0.808 0.729 0.743 0.45 0.493 0.584 0.490
7 0.950** 1.053** 1.086** 1.144** 0.876 0.798 0.812 0.518 0.561 0.653 0.558
8 0.762* 0.866* 0.898** 0.956** 0.688 0.61 0.624 0.33 0.373 0.465 0.371
9 0.626 0.729* 0.761* 0.819* 0.551 0.473 0.487 0.193 0.237 0.328 0.234
10 0.365 0.468 0.501 0.558 0.291 0.212 0.226 -0.067 -0.024 0.067 -0.027
11 0.151 0.254 0.286 0.344 0.076 -0.002 0.012 -0.282 -0.238 -0.147 -0.241
12 0.136 0.239 0.272 0.329 0.062 -0.017 -0.003 -0.296 -0.253 -0.162 -0.256
13 0.189 0.292 0.324 0.382 0.114 0.036 0.05 -0.244 -0.2 -0.109 -0.203
14 -0.005 0.098 0.131 0.188 -0.079 -0.158 -0.144 -0.437 -0.394 -0.303 -0.397
15 0.040 0.143 0.175 0.233 -0.035 -0.113 -0.099 -0.393 -0.349 -0.258 -0.352
ANN 0.111 0.214 0.246 0.304* 0.036 -0.042 -0.028 -0.322 -0.278 -0.187 -0.281
17 0.103 0.136 0.193 -0.074 -0.153 -0.139 -0.432 -0.389 -0.298 -0.392
18 0.032 0.09 -0.178 -0.256 -0.242 -0.535 -0.492 -0.401 -0.495
19 0.058 -0.21 -0.288 -0.274 -0.568 -0.524 -0.433 -0.527
20 -0.268 -0.346 -0.332 -0.626 -0.582 -0.491 -0.585
EFF -0.078 -0.064 -0.358 -0.314 -0.223 -0.317
22 0.014 -0.28 -0.236 -0.145 -0.239
Notes: Average cumulative abnormal returns are reported for the period starting on the row label and ending according to the
column label. These are averaged over time and industry. A t-test across the time-industry space results in a report of their
difference from zero. Significant returns are denoted by * - 5%, ** - 1% and *** - 0.1%. A full set of results are reported in
the supplementary material.
on holding shares in firms which de-list from the DJSI in the given years. As with the listings there is a clear
pre-announcement effect with positive CARs are seen for holding periods which end in the days prior to
the announcement. Compared to the listing effects these pre-announcement values have greater significance.
Many ranges which end on the announcement date have significance for de-listing, but this was not seen
in the listing case. Once the information about which firms have not met the criteria to retain their place
on the DJSI becomes public there are far fewer statistically significant differences between average CARs
and zero compared to that for the firms announced as joining. Strong negative correction effects appear
throughout the lower right of Table 10 but none of these have any statistical significance attached.
4.3 Comparison
Three approaches to identifying the listing effects of joining the DJSI have been presented in this paper and
we have seen variations in the predictions made. Two-sample tests revealed few significant effects pre-listing
with only a small region of positive CARs identified a week before the announcement. Holdings from this
time offered significant returns when held to day 19 also. When considering the base sample these joining
effects lose significance. Only those positive CARs on periods starting on the announcement date, and ending
on the subsequent days, are significant in both the full and base samples. None of these positive listing effects
are noted in the OLS modelling, subsumed in the control for leverage and profitability. Given the large size
requirement to join the DJSI such results may seem unsurprising, but they are premised on the idea that
out-of-sample prediction from simple asset pricing models in the correct way to calculate expected returns.
In the OLS regressions there were no significant impacts of listing for any of the considered periods.
Identified CARs were absorbed by the strength of the role of other firm characteristics that are linked to
returns; size leverage and profitability were all shown to have significance in Table ??. Critically gaining
DJSI status was not. Such significance shows the importance of the controls when comparing two samples
and reminds of the need to take care when using differences in sample means as measures of impact.
Utilising the generalised synthetic control approach means there is only one variable being considered,
the returns of the share for which the synthetic control is being generated. What is important for generating
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the counterfactual is not the levels of financial performance in the control set, but the way their share price
contributes to a portfolio which matches the behaviour of the firm to be listed. Like the CAPM we have
only to consider the firms at an individual level, but the presence of the controls is allowing the performance
of others to affect CARs. Across a single year there will be few changes in a firms financial performance,
meaning that the relationships between shares would not be expected to change by much between the control
and treatment periods. Hence the CARs encapsulate many of the benefits that come from understanding
the relative properties of the control firms without imposing restrictions on the control set.
When considering the de-listing effects a further comparison may be drawn between these results and
those obtained from the CAPM CARs in Table ??. Pre-announcement effects are much larger in magnitude
and significant for a far greater range of dates than they were in the full sample comparison. When restricting
to the base sample there are more similarities; such is natural as the algorithm creates a weighted portfolio
to match control period returns and would therefore select firms with closer characteristics to the de-listing
firm. However, the magnitude of the generalised synthetic control differentials is slightly smaller and fades
rapidly post announcement; the CAPM CARs from the base sample did not. To the study of firms that
leave the DJSI the generalised synthetic control approach thus offers a mediator between effects that are
overstated in the base sample and understated for the full sample, doing so whilst drawing on the maximum
possible information set.
Within the results there is thus support for the twin hypotheses derived from the literature. Firstly the
benefit of higher expected profitability causes a rise in the price of the share over and above any effects
happening to the control shares. Secondly there is a correction as the lower risk associated with CSR
activities takes over; such is consistent with the standard assumptions on the risk/return relationship. Our
confirmation from this approach lends weight to the theories and results of Oberndorfer et al. (2013) and
others.
Our generalised synthetic control approach picks up a strong positive significant return on the listed firms
if held from the start of the treatment period to the week ahead of the announcement, and indeed on the
same shares held to the effective date. In this way the pre-announcement effect is more notable than it is in
the CAPM based bivariate analyses. By contrast the large gains that were suggested between announcement
and effective dates are not significant and much smaller in magnitude. As with the pre-announcement effect,
the correction effect is much stronger in the synthetic control. Buying the listed firms the day after listing
consistently produces negative CARs; shorting these shares augurs potential profit for investors. This paper
thus evidences more effects of gaining DJSI listing than past approaches. In so doing it reinforces the need
for investors to research carefully when considering buying firms which achieve, or are likely to achieve, the
recognition of good CSR practice afforded by DJSI listing.
5 Year Effects
Heterogeneity between years is readily controlled in this analysis as the process of abnormal return generation
treats each year independently. Using the data collected tests can be performed to identify whether the
average CAR for a given holding period is identical across two years. By constructing matched pairs over
a week of start dates and a week of end dates subsamples are created that may then be considered. In
what follows the average difference is reported together with a significance based upon the t-test for equality
between the paired samples. First the tests are performed for the firms gaining listing to the DJSI and
second for those being de-listed. For this element of the paper effects are only studied for the generalised
synthetic control returns. Theory may suggest that investor reaction to these two opposite events would be
in opposite directions.
Tables 12 and 13 present t-tests for equality of CARs on each holding start and end date between year
pairs. These are paired t-tests since the aim is to establish equality for a given period, for example from
announcement day to effective day. Each panel therefore considers a range of from and to dates to create
the samples for testing. Panel (a) looks at stocks being purchased in the first week of the treatment period,
Week 1 (days 1 to 5 inclusive), and being held to the week before the announcement, Week 3 (days 11 to 14),
inclusive. Panel (a) thus covers the longest period of the samples considered. It was seen that there were
strong positive returns when averaging across the years. Panel (b) focuses in on the days prior to listing
considering only those holding periods starting, and ending, between days 11 and 14 inclusive. Panel (c)
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includes the day before the announcement and runs through to the day after the effective day. In this way all
impacts concerned with the publication of information are captured. Finally, panel (d) looks at the period
immediately subsequent to this to capture any correction effects that may occur. Identical periods are used
here for both listing and de-listing.
For firms joining the DJSI panel (a) of Table 12 shows a larger CAR for 2007 as the market learns more
about what listing means. However, in 2008 there is no significance and 2009 is regularly smaller than later
years. Only further into the post crisis period are the average CARs larger. Positive values in the 2017
and 2018 columns inform that recent listings have not had such large effects as the years described by the
rows. Such patterns extend into the consideration of just the pre-announcement week (panel (b)), although
here 2007 is less significant and the difference between 2008 and other years is much larger. Panel (c) shows
further dominance by 2008 but moving toward the bottom right it is apparent that the row years often have
smaller CARs than the column years; the size of the listing CAR is growing over time. Similar “u-shaped”
relations are also spotted in the post-listing period of panel (d). Here again the financial crisis has strong
positive values to it’s t-test difference with each local firm. From around 2010 all years have smaller average
CARs than the subsequent year; this may mean the market is learning but heterogeneity across firms limits
the depth to which such differentials may be read into.
An immediate observation is that again there is strong significance in all of the comparisons. 2006 had
the largest CARs in all periods, this may be suggestive of learning about the index and the impact on stock
prices for a firm being removed from the list. Holdings from the first week of the treatment period (Week
1) to the days before the announcement (Week 3) were notably smaller in 2008 and were then significantly
smaller than in all subsequent years. Panel (a) of Table 13 shows that only 2014 has similarly small CARs
as 2008, both being significantly lower than other years. Large positive differences between 2006 and other
years are likely to be driven by the declining state of the economy post crisis and the fact that it never fully
recovered. There may also be expected to be a realisation that consumers are increasingly likely to punish
firms who miss their CSR targets. [**** ADD REFERENCE HERE]
For those periods which include the announcement interest is naturally drawn to the span between
announcement and effective date. Panel (c) reports on the period between the announcement and the de-
listing revealing very mixed differences in the CARs. Whilst 2009 has consistently lower CARs than more
recent years there is little consistency in the direction of the changes between 2012 and 2018. Such changes
are in alignment with investors learning about the behaviour of stocks after de-listing and hence gaining
a deeper understanding of the implications of a de-listing announcement. Looking at panel (d) it may be
seen that more recently the CARs have been larger than they were through the crisis and its’ aftermath.
Recalling that this panel is studying the correction effect, with negative CARs, this test is showing that the
magnitude of the mean reversion is larger in recent years.
A comparison between the exit results and those for the entering firms informs that the reduction in
CARs for the pre-announcement period is broadly common on both listing and de-listing. 2010 and 2011
have bigger CARs on average than are observed from 2014 onwards.Theory suggests that the market would
be moving in opposite directions for listing and de-listing since the implications on the CSR signal are in
opposite directions. In the early years that is evidenced by the t-tests of Tables 13
Figure 2 provides a graphical impression of the differences across years showing the first year for which
there are listings and de-listings available, 2006, the financial crisis of 2008 and the most recent set of
observations in 2018. In all cases the vertical axes are plotted from -4 to 4 to enable comparability between
plots. In the top row there is some evidence of movement pre-announcement in the delisting plots, whilst
the CARs on stocks gaining listing only really move upward around day 18 to day 24. 2008 was much more
erratic with many shares going outside the +/- 5% range shown on the plots. De-listings were calmer with
a generally positive effect seen post effective date. This contrasts with a broadly negative level of CAR for
those firms gaining listing in 2008. In 2018 the pre-announcement effect is more visible as the various listed
shares track each other more closely, the correction effect can also be seen in panel (e). These plots remind
that amongst the average effects reported there will invariably be heterogeneities amongst stocks. Investors
pursuing a particular strategy based on averages would always be reminded of this.
Overall the set of treated firms is limited to only a few per year. Whilst further division of the dataset
would be desirable to control for other known heterogeneity sources it becomes difficult to obtain a significant
sample size for statistical inference. In this way an opening for more exploratory data science approaches may
be found. Such extensions into data science are left beyond the scope of this paper. Here focus remains on
25
T
a
b
le
1
2
:
N
ew
w
ay
o
f
d
o
in
g
th
in
g
s
fr
o
m
/
t
o
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
0
5
0
.4
9
1
*
*
*
-2
.1
9
6
*
*
*
-0
.3
8
5
0
.6
4
2
*
*
*
-2
.2
7
1
*
*
*
-1
.3
4
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.5
1
8
*
0
.2
0
8
-0
.2
3
3
*
*
1
.3
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
4
2
0
0
6
-2
.6
8
7
*
*
*
-0
.8
7
6
*
0
.1
5
1
-2
.7
6
1
*
*
*
-1
.8
3
1
*
*
*
-1
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.4
9
4
*
*
*
-1
.0
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
3
-0
.7
2
3
*
*
*
0
.8
7
1
*
*
*
-0
.7
2
5
*
*
*
2
0
0
7
1
.8
1
1
*
*
*
2
.8
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
4
0
.8
5
6
*
*
*
1
.6
6
8
*
*
*
2
.1
9
3
*
*
*
1
.6
7
8
*
*
*
2
.4
0
4
*
*
*
1
.9
6
4
*
*
*
3
.5
5
8
*
*
*
1
.9
6
2
*
*
*
2
0
0
8
1
.0
2
7
*
-1
.8
8
5
*
*
-0
.9
5
5
*
-0
.1
4
3
0
.3
8
2
-0
.1
3
3
0
.5
9
3
0
.1
5
3
1
.7
4
8
*
*
*
0
.1
5
1
2
0
0
9
-2
.9
1
3
*
*
*
-1
.9
8
2
*
*
*
-1
.1
7
*
*
*
-0
.6
4
6
*
*
*
-1
.1
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.8
7
5
*
*
*
0
.7
2
*
*
*
-0
.8
7
6
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.9
3
*
*
*
1
.7
4
2
*
*
*
2
.2
6
7
*
*
*
1
.7
5
3
*
*
*
2
.4
7
8
*
*
*
2
.0
3
8
*
*
*
3
.6
3
3
*
*
*
2
.0
3
7
*
*
*
2
0
1
1
0
.8
1
2
*
*
*
1
.3
3
7
*
*
*
0
.8
2
2
*
*
1
.5
4
8
*
*
*
1
.1
0
8
*
*
*
2
.7
0
3
*
*
*
1
.1
0
6
*
*
*
2
0
1
2
0
.5
2
5
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
.7
3
6
*
*
*
0
.2
9
6
*
*
*
1
.8
9
*
*
*
0
.2
9
4
*
2
0
1
3
-0
.5
1
5
0
.2
1
1
-0
.2
2
9
*
1
.3
6
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
0
*
*
2
0
1
4
0
.7
2
6
0
.2
8
5
1
.8
8
*
*
*
0
.2
8
4
2
0
1
5
-0
.4
4
*
*
1
.1
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.4
4
2
*
*
2
0
1
6
1
.5
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
2
0
1
7
-1
.5
9
6
*
*
*
2
0
0
5
0
.2
0
1
*
*
-0
.7
0
6
*
1
.4
5
1
*
-0
.2
6
2
-1
.0
8
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
6
*
0
.0
4
8
-0
.5
8
8
*
0
.0
3
-0
.0
8
5
-0
.1
4
9
0
.2
0
9
-0
.7
4
*
*
2
0
0
6
-0
.5
0
5
1
.6
5
2
*
*
-0
.0
6
1
-0
.8
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
6
5
0
.2
4
9
*
-0
.3
8
7
*
0
.2
3
1
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
5
2
0
.4
1
*
*
-0
.5
3
9
*
*
2
0
0
7
2
.1
5
7
*
0
.4
4
4
-0
.3
7
9
0
.3
4
0
.7
5
4
*
0
.1
1
8
0
.7
3
6
*
0
.6
2
1
*
0
.5
5
8
0
.9
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
2
0
0
8
-1
.7
1
4
*
-2
.5
3
6
*
*
-1
.8
1
7
*
-1
.4
0
3
*
-2
.0
3
9
*
-1
.4
2
2
*
-1
.5
3
7
*
-1
.6
*
*
-1
.2
4
2
*
-2
.1
9
1
*
*
2
0
0
9
-0
.8
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
3
0
.3
1
-0
.3
2
6
*
*
0
.2
9
2
*
0
.1
7
7
*
0
.1
1
4
0
.4
7
2
*
*
-0
.4
7
7
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.7
1
9
*
*
*
1
.1
3
3
*
*
*
0
.4
9
7
*
*
1
.1
1
5
*
*
*
1
*
*
*
0
.9
3
6
*
*
*
1
.2
9
4
*
*
*
0
.3
4
5
*
2
0
1
1
0
.4
1
4
-0
.2
2
3
0
.3
9
5
*
0
.2
8
0
.2
1
7
0
.5
7
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
7
4
*
2
0
1
2
-0
.6
3
6
*
*
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.1
3
3
-0
.1
9
6
*
*
0
.1
6
1
-0
.7
8
7
*
*
2
0
1
3
0
.6
1
8
*
*
*
0
.5
0
3
*
*
*
0
.4
4
*
0
.7
9
8
*
*
-0
.1
5
1
2
0
1
4
-0
.1
1
5
*
-0
.1
7
8
0
.1
8
-0
.7
6
9
*
*
2
0
1
5
-0
.0
6
3
0
.2
9
5
*
-0
.6
5
4
*
*
2
0
1
6
0
.3
5
8
*
-0
.5
9
1
*
2
0
1
7
-0
.9
4
9
*
*
*
2
0
0
5
-0
.0
8
5
-0
.1
4
8
-1
.8
9
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
6
-0
.1
5
5
-0
.0
2
8
0
.4
1
8
*
*
0
.1
7
3
-0
.5
6
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
7
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
0
.3
0
9
*
0
.7
5
5
*
*
*
2
0
0
6
-0
.0
6
3
-1
.8
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
7
0
.0
5
7
0
.5
0
3
*
*
*
0
.2
5
9
-0
.4
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
9
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
4
0
.3
9
5
*
*
*
0
.8
4
*
*
*
2
0
0
7
-1
.7
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
8
0
.1
1
9
0
.5
6
6
*
*
*
0
.3
2
1
*
*
-0
.4
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.4
3
1
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
0
.4
5
7
*
*
*
0
.9
0
3
*
*
*
2
0
0
8
1
.7
4
1
*
*
*
1
.7
4
1
*
*
*
1
.8
6
8
*
*
*
2
.3
1
4
*
*
*
2
.0
7
*
*
*
1
.3
3
1
*
*
*
1
.3
1
7
*
*
*
1
.7
2
7
*
*
*
2
.2
0
6
*
*
*
2
.6
5
1
*
*
*
2
0
0
9
0
.1
2
7
0
.5
7
3
*
*
*
0
.3
2
9
-0
.4
1
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.4
6
5
*
*
0
.9
1
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.1
2
7
0
.5
7
3
*
*
*
0
.3
2
9
*
-0
.4
1
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.4
6
5
*
*
*
0
.9
1
*
*
*
2
0
1
1
0
.4
4
6
*
0
.2
0
2
-0
.5
3
7
*
*
-0
.5
5
1
*
-0
.1
4
1
0
.3
3
8
*
0
.7
8
3
*
*
*
2
0
1
2
-0
.2
4
4
-0
.9
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.9
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
8
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
8
0
.3
3
7
*
*
2
0
1
3
-0
.7
3
9
*
*
*
-0
.7
5
2
*
*
-0
.3
4
3
*
0
.1
3
6
0
.5
8
2
*
*
2
0
1
4
-0
.0
1
4
0
.3
9
6
*
*
*
0
.8
7
5
*
*
*
1
.3
2
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
0
.4
0
9
*
*
0
.8
8
9
*
*
*
1
.3
3
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
6
0
.4
7
9
*
*
*
0
.9
2
5
*
*
*
2
0
1
7
0
.4
4
6
*
*
*
2
0
0
5
-0
.6
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.6
5
*
*
*
-1
.9
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.7
2
9
*
*
*
-1
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
2
*
0
.1
6
6
0
.8
6
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
*
-1
.9
6
7
*
*
*
-0
.8
4
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
5
3
*
*
1
.4
6
2
*
*
*
2
0
0
6
0
-0
.0
3
9
-1
.2
9
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
8
-0
.4
*
*
*
0
.3
2
9
*
0
.7
7
7
*
*
*
1
.4
7
8
*
*
*
0
.2
9
1
-1
.3
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
4
*
*
0
.2
5
7
*
*
2
.0
7
2
*
*
*
2
0
0
7
-1
.2
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
9
-0
.3
6
1
*
*
*
0
.3
6
8
*
*
*
0
.8
1
6
*
*
*
1
.5
1
7
*
*
*
0
.3
3
*
-1
.3
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
5
*
*
0
.2
9
7
*
*
2
.1
1
2
*
*
*
2
0
0
8
1
.1
7
7
*
*
*
0
.8
9
5
*
*
*
1
.6
2
4
*
*
*
2
.0
7
2
*
*
*
2
.7
7
3
*
*
*
1
.5
8
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
1
1
.0
6
1
*
*
*
1
.5
5
3
*
*
*
3
.3
6
8
*
*
*
2
0
0
9
-0
.2
8
2
*
*
0
.4
4
7
*
*
*
0
.8
9
5
*
*
*
1
.5
9
6
*
*
*
0
.4
0
9
*
*
-1
.2
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
6
0
.3
7
6
*
*
2
.1
9
1
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.7
2
9
*
*
*
1
.1
7
7
*
*
*
1
.8
7
8
*
*
*
0
.6
9
1
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
6
*
*
*
0
.1
6
6
*
0
.6
5
8
*
*
*
2
.4
7
3
*
*
*
2
0
1
1
0
.4
4
8
*
*
1
.1
4
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
8
-1
.6
8
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
6
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
1
1
.7
4
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
2
0
.7
0
1
*
*
*
-0
.4
8
6
*
*
-2
.1
3
3
*
*
*
-1
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.5
1
9
*
*
*
1
.2
9
6
*
*
*
2
0
1
3
-1
.1
8
7
*
*
*
-2
.8
3
4
*
*
*
-1
.7
1
2
*
*
*
-1
.2
2
1
*
*
*
0
.5
9
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
4
-1
.6
4
7
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
1
.7
8
2
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
1
.1
2
2
*
*
*
1
.6
1
3
*
*
*
3
.4
2
9
*
*
*
2
0
1
6
0
.4
9
2
*
*
*
2
.3
0
7
*
*
*
2
0
1
7
1
.8
1
5
*
*
*
26
T
ab
le
13
:
T
w
o
-s
a
m
p
le
te
st
s
fo
r
C
A
R
eq
u
a
li
ty
b
et
w
ee
n
y
ea
rs
:
D
el
is
ti
n
g
fr
o
m
/
t
o
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
P
a
n
e
l(
a
)
:
W
e
e
k
1
t
o
W
e
e
k
3
2
0
0
6
0
.8
9
7
*
*
2
.0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.7
0
8
*
*
*
0
.2
7
1
*
*
1
.1
3
9
*
*
*
0
.2
6
3
*
0
.8
9
1
*
*
*
1
.6
4
7
*
*
*
1
.0
4
9
*
*
*
1
.2
2
3
*
*
*
0
.6
1
5
*
*
*
1
.2
8
6
*
*
*
”
2
0
0
7
1
.1
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.1
8
9
-0
.6
2
5
*
0
.2
4
2
-0
.6
3
4
-0
.0
0
5
0
.7
5
0
*
*
0
.1
5
3
0
.3
2
7
-0
.2
8
1
0
.3
8
9
2
0
0
8
-1
.3
1
1
*
*
*
-1
.7
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.8
8
1
*
*
*
-1
.7
5
6
*
*
*
-1
.1
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
7
2
-0
.9
7
*
*
*
-0
.7
9
6
*
*
*
-1
.4
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.7
3
4
*
*
*
2
0
0
9
-0
.4
3
7
*
*
*
0
.4
3
1
*
*
-0
.4
4
5
*
*
*
0
.1
8
3
0
.9
3
9
*
*
0
.3
4
1
0
.5
1
5
*
*
-0
.0
9
3
0
.5
7
8
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.8
6
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
0
.6
2
*
*
*
1
.3
7
6
*
*
*
0
.7
7
8
*
*
*
0
.9
5
2
*
*
*
0
.3
4
4
*
*
1
.0
1
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
1
-0
.8
7
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
4
7
*
*
*
0
.5
0
8
*
-0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
5
-0
.5
2
3
*
*
0
.1
4
7
*
2
0
1
2
0
.6
2
8
*
*
*
1
.3
8
4
*
*
*
0
.7
8
7
*
*
*
0
.9
6
*
*
*
0
.3
5
2
*
*
1
.0
2
3
*
*
*
2
0
1
3
0
.7
5
6
*
*
0
.1
5
8
0
.3
3
2
*
-0
.2
7
6
*
0
.3
9
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
4
-0
.5
9
7
*
-0
.4
2
4
-1
.0
3
2
*
*
-0
.3
6
1
2
0
1
5
0
.1
7
4
-0
.4
3
4
0
.2
3
6
2
0
1
6
-0
.6
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
6
2
2
0
1
7
0
.6
7
*
*
*
P
a
n
e
l(
b
)
:
W
e
e
k
3
t
o
W
e
e
k
3
2
0
0
6
0
.5
9
5
*
*
1
.9
4
5
*
*
0
.8
*
0
.2
8
4
*
0
.0
2
4
0
.1
2
9
0
.1
9
4
*
0
.3
9
8
*
*
0
.7
7
2
*
*
*
-1
.0
1
8
*
*
-0
.2
5
3
*
*
0
.1
7
5
2
0
0
7
1
.3
5
*
0
.2
0
5
-0
.3
1
1
*
*
-0
.5
7
1
*
*
-0
.4
6
5
*
*
-0
.4
0
1
-0
.1
9
7
*
0
.1
7
8
-1
.6
1
2
*
*
*
-0
.8
4
8
*
*
-0
.4
2
0
2
0
0
8
-1
.1
4
5
*
-1
.6
6
1
*
*
-1
.9
2
1
*
*
-1
.8
1
5
*
*
-1
.7
5
1
*
-1
.5
4
7
*
-1
.1
7
2
*
-2
.9
6
2
*
*
-2
.1
9
8
*
*
-1
.7
7
*
2
0
0
9
-0
.5
1
6
-0
.7
7
6
-0
.6
7
1
-0
.6
0
6
-0
.4
0
2
-0
.0
2
8
-1
.8
1
8
*
*
-1
.0
5
3
*
-0
.6
2
5
2
0
1
0
-0
.2
6
*
-0
.1
5
5
*
-0
.0
9
0
.1
1
4
0
.4
8
8
*
-1
.3
0
2
*
*
-0
.5
3
7
*
*
-0
.1
0
9
2
0
1
1
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
7
0
.3
7
3
*
0
.7
4
8
*
-1
.0
4
2
*
*
-0
.2
7
7
0
.1
5
1
2
0
1
2
0
.0
6
5
0
.2
6
8
*
0
.6
4
3
*
*
-1
.1
4
7
*
*
-0
.3
8
2
*
0
.0
4
6
2
0
1
3
0
.2
0
4
0
.5
7
8
*
*
*
-1
.2
1
2
*
*
-0
.4
4
7
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
2
0
1
4
0
.3
7
5
*
-1
.4
1
5
*
*
-0
.6
5
*
*
-0
.2
2
2
2
0
1
5
-1
.7
9
0
*
*
*
-1
.0
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.5
9
7
*
*
2
0
1
6
0
.7
6
5
*
1
.1
9
3
*
*
2
0
1
7
0
.4
2
8
*
*
P
a
n
e
l(
c
)
:
W
e
e
k
4
t
o
W
e
e
k
4
2
0
0
6
0
.5
1
2
*
*
*
1
.3
3
8
*
*
*
1
.7
4
4
*
*
*
1
.1
5
5
*
*
*
1
.2
1
8
*
*
*
0
.7
2
8
*
*
*
1
.1
9
5
*
*
*
0
.6
5
8
*
*
*
0
.2
4
0
*
*
1
.0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.8
0
3
*
*
*
0
.6
0
3
*
*
2
0
0
7
0
.8
2
6
*
*
1
.2
3
2
*
*
*
0
.6
4
3
*
*
*
0
.7
0
7
*
*
*
0
.2
1
6
*
0
.6
8
4
*
*
*
0
.1
4
6
-0
.2
7
1
*
*
0
.5
3
5
*
*
*
0
.2
9
1
*
*
*
0
.0
9
1
2
0
0
8
0
.4
0
6
-0
.1
8
3
-0
.1
1
9
-0
.6
1
*
-0
.1
4
2
-0
.6
8
*
-1
.0
9
7
*
*
-0
.2
9
1
-0
.5
3
5
-0
.7
3
5
*
2
0
0
9
-0
.5
8
9
*
*
*
-0
.5
2
6
*
*
-1
.0
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.5
4
9
*
*
*
-1
.0
8
6
*
*
*
-1
.5
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.6
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.9
4
1
*
*
*
-1
.1
4
1
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
0
.0
6
4
-0
.4
2
7
*
*
*
0
.0
4
-0
.4
9
7
*
*
*
-0
.9
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
8
-0
.3
5
2
*
*
*
-0
.5
5
2
*
*
*
2
0
1
1
-0
.4
9
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.5
6
*
*
*
-0
.9
7
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
2
-0
.4
1
6
*
-0
.6
1
5
*
*
2
0
1
2
0
.4
6
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
-0
.4
8
8
*
*
0
.3
1
9
*
*
0
.0
7
5
-0
.1
2
5
2
0
1
3
-0
.5
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.9
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
4
9
*
*
-0
.3
9
3
*
*
*
-0
.5
9
2
*
*
*
2
0
1
4
-0
.4
1
8
*
0
.3
8
9
*
*
0
.1
4
5
-0
.0
5
5
2
0
1
5
0
.8
0
6
*
*
*
0
.5
6
2
*
*
*
0
.3
6
3
2
0
1
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0
.2
4
4
*
*
-0
.4
4
4
*
*
*
2
0
1
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0
.2
0
0
P
a
n
e
l(
d
)
:
W
e
e
k
4
t
o
W
e
e
k
5
2
0
0
6
1
.7
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.3
9
5
2
.2
4
2
*
*
*
1
.9
6
5
*
*
*
3
.9
5
9
*
*
*
2
.3
7
6
*
*
*
3
.3
8
9
*
*
*
1
.8
0
8
*
*
*
1
.4
0
1
*
*
*
2
.0
3
3
*
*
*
1
.9
1
6
*
*
*
2
.0
1
*
*
*
2
0
0
8
-2
.1
8
*
*
*
0
.4
5
7
*
*
*
0
.1
8
2
.1
7
5
*
*
*
0
.5
9
1
*
*
*
1
.6
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
2
3
-0
.3
8
4
*
*
*
0
.2
4
9
*
0
.1
3
1
*
0
.2
2
6
*
2
0
0
9
2
.6
3
7
*
*
*
2
.3
6
*
*
*
4
.3
5
4
*
*
*
2
.7
7
1
*
*
*
3
.7
8
5
*
*
*
2
.2
0
3
*
*
*
1
.7
9
6
*
*
*
2
.4
2
8
*
*
*
2
.3
1
1
*
*
*
2
.4
0
6
*
*
*
2
0
1
0
-0
.2
7
7
*
*
*
1
.7
1
7
*
*
*
0
.1
3
4
1
.1
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.4
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.8
4
1
*
*
*
-0
.2
0
9
-0
.3
2
6
*
*
-0
.2
3
1
*
2
0
1
1
1
.9
9
4
*
*
*
0
.4
1
1
*
*
*
1
.4
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
7
-0
.5
6
4
*
*
*
0
.0
6
8
-0
.0
4
9
0
.0
4
6
2
0
1
2
-1
.5
8
3
*
*
*
-0
.5
7
*
*
*
-2
.1
5
2
*
*
*
-2
.5
5
8
*
*
*
-1
.9
2
6
*
*
*
-2
.0
4
3
*
*
*
-1
.9
4
9
*
*
*
2
0
1
3
1
.0
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.5
6
8
*
*
*
-0
.9
7
5
*
*
*
-0
.3
4
3
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
5
*
*
*
2
0
1
4
-1
.5
8
2
*
*
*
-1
.9
8
8
*
*
*
-1
.3
5
6
*
*
*
-1
.4
7
4
*
*
*
-1
.3
7
9
*
*
*
2
0
1
5
-0
.4
0
7
*
*
*
0
.2
2
5
*
0
.1
0
8
0
.2
0
3
*
*
2
0
1
6
0
.6
3
2
*
*
*
0
.5
1
5
*
*
*
0
.6
1
*
*
*
2
0
1
7
-0
.1
1
7
-0
.0
2
2
2
0
1
8
0
.0
9
5
N
o
te
s:
C
A
R
s
.
T
o
a
id
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
w
ee
k
s
a
re
la
b
el
le
d
su
ch
th
a
t
W
ee
k
1
in
cl
u
d
es
d
a
y
s
1
to
5
in
cl
u
si
v
e,
W
ee
k
2
co
v
er
s
d
a
y
s
6
to
1
0
in
cl
u
si
v
e
a
n
d
W
ee
k
3
co
v
er
s
d
a
y
s
1
1
to
1
4
in
cl
u
si
v
e.
W
ee
k
4
co
v
er
s
d
a
y
s
1
5
to
2
2
in
cl
u
si
v
e,
w
h
il
st
W
ee
k
5
is
u
se
d
to
g
et
a
t
th
e
co
rr
ec
ti
o
n
eff
ec
t
in
d
a
y
s
2
2
to
2
7
in
cl
u
si
v
e.
27
Figure 2: Comparison of listing and de-listing effects
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the means through which abnormal returns are constructed, the contrast between the generalised synthetic
control and CAPM. Resolving that question then makes all of the analyses that follow more credible.
6 Discussion
This paper seeks to understand more of the impact of firm CSR performance on their stock returns. It
achieves this goal using a binary rating of whether a firm receives their listing, or not. There are many
reasons to call into question such an arbitrary measure, but as outlined there is much to be said for a simple
measure. Ability to interpret is critical and the binary approach does permit a clear communication with
investors and the public alike. Such appeal has led to a wealth of literature capturing CSR in this binary
way. Event studies become a viable method as the listing is fixed externally and is not related to the level
of returns a share is experiencing at the time of the listing, or de-listing.
Through the construction of a synthetic control potential post-evaluation period impacts on non-treated
shares are accounted for in a way existing event studies have failed to do. By comparing a listed share to the
performance of a portfolio of its’ peers a greater understanding of the listing impact is gained. It is seen that
there is an impact three weeks ahead of the effective date. Confirmation is found of a positive listing effect
in the pre-change period, and a small correction in the days following the announcement. Precise durations
differ because of our use of two dates, which affords our results greater accuracy to the motivational story
than is found in past works with only one change date. However, in all cases the size of the abnormal return
is much larger in the synthetic control. There is a definite argument for incorporating relative performance
to avoid such effects being masked by linear models.
Synthetic controls can offer potential new insights for a series of treatments in finance, such as the impact
of cross-listing, option availability and changes to trading rules. All of these would represent interesting
applications to complement this study and the connection study of Acemoglu et al. (2016). Here assets are
used as a time-invariant control because of the comparatively large size of DJSI listed firms compared to the
majority of non-DJSI listed firms. Extending the set of controls, including introducing time-variant controls,
becomes increasingly possible. However, the low error within the simple fit lends a tractability to the work
presented here. Likewise the approach may be fitted to intra-day data, although appropriate account for
noise would be beneficial if making such an extension. This paper highlights such potential and the value of
controlling for post-treatment events.
Listing on the DJSI sends an important signal to the market that a firm has achieved the highest
standards of CSR. However, the effect on investors has long been considered ambiguous. Increased demand
from consumers has potential to raise profitability, but in turn this delivers a stability that means lower
returns are required to compensate for risk in the share price. Over and above any other impacts upon
the returns of newly-listed DJSI members it is shown that abnormal returns fall when the market becomes
aware of the listing. Negative effects quickly dissipate leaving an insignificant impact of DJSI listing on
stock-returns.
7 Summary
Being listed to the DJSI sends a clear signal to the market that a firm has obtained a high level of CSR
performance, and that it will be treated as such by the market. There have been numerous attempts to
capture this effect but they either fail to account for important control variables, such as the two-sample
approach, or they require careful matching to focus on the true change effect. By exploring the generalised
synthetic control (Xu, 2017) as a useful multi-treatment version of the Abadie et al. (2010) method this paper
has demonstrated strong abnormal returns for stocks which list on the DJSI North America. These returns
far out-rated those suggested by CAPM and produced listing effects greater than those from comparing new
joiners CAPM CAR with the CAR of the controls. Where two sample approaches indicate strong positive
CARs between announcement and listings becoming effective and listing the synthetic control approach does
not.
We conclude that in both listing and de-listing cases there are higher returns initially, but that as the
news goes public the response reverses to bring stocks back to their usual return levels. In the delisting
case the generalised synthetic control results shows effects fade quicker, brining stocks back to their relative
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position opposite their industry competitors far quicker than in the earlier years of the DJSI North America.
When contrasitng across time the difference in the financial crisis is readily apparent. Equally the time
effects shown in this paper show that uncertainty about the benefits of CSR status, and hence the returns
to CSR, have varied magnitude over time.
There is scope to introduce more control variables to hone the match of the portfolio, and models beyond
the CAPM could be useful. Splitting the time period may be fruitful, as the financial crisis is well known
from the literature for creating an important role for socially responsible investment. Further extension
could be made to winzorise the returns data, or to relax the assumption that stocks must have all of their
data present. Although computationally intensive that remains an option for further work. Notwithstanding
these questions the results produce cast important light on a positive benefit of listing which appears over
and above the returns the treated stock would have obtained having not been listed.
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